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CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW HELP RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS OVER 
UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN THE EAST CHINA SEA? 
MICHAEL C. DAVIS
* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping once famously urged that resolution of 
disputes with China’s neighbors over uninhabited islands be put off to a later 
generation, stating: “Our generation is not wise enough to find common language 
on this question.  The next generation will certainly be wiser.”1  Such sage advice 
seemed practical at the time, freeing China and its neighbors to focus on more 
pressing trade and economic development efforts.  The wisdom of continuing 
deferral of the disputes over uninhabited islands is now in doubt, at least when 
peaceful alternatives may be considered.  Beyond the rapid economic development 
and the consequent explosion of resource demands that has occurred since Deng 
uttered these words, technological development has made these deep seabed 
resources more readily accessible.
2
  Added to this has been China’s rapid economic 
development and associated military rise, encouraging China’s expanded attention 
to territorial sovereignty and resource claims in its periphery.
3
  Increased military 
confrontations over disputed islands have added to the urgency of this matter, and 
an impasse has prevailed.
4
 
 
*  University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law (mcdavis@hku.hk). 
 1. CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA’S 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 38 (2004); see also CHI-KIN LO, CHINA’S POLICY TOWARD TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES: THE CASE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISLANDS 171 (2003). 
 2. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EAST CHINA SEA 1 (Sept. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/east_china_sea/east_china_sea.pdf (stating although the 
East China Sea may have abundant oil and natural gas resources, unresolved territorial disputes 
continue to hinder exploration and development in the area); Michael T. Klare, Island Grabbing in 
Asia: Why the South China Seas are So Tense, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138093/michael-t-klare/island-grabbing-in-asia. 
 3. Asia’s Balance of Power: China’s Military Rise, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21552212; Toshi Yoshihara, War By Other Means: China’s Political 
Uses of Seapower, DIPLOMAT (Sept. 26, 2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/26/war-by-other-
means-chinas-political-uses-of-seapower; Kurt Campbell, Trouble at Sea Reveals the New Shape of 
China’s Foreign Policy, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 2014, http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2014/07/22/trouble-at-
sea-reveals-the-new-shape-of-chinas-foreign-policy. 
 4. Japan Defense Paper Warns of China’s ‘Dangerous Acts’ in Sea, Air, TIMES INDIA, Aug. 5, 
2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/Japan-defence-paper-warns-over-Chinas-
dangerous-acts-in-sea-air/articleshow/39663923.cms; Chinese Ships Advance in Waters Near Diaoyus 
Defying Japan’s White Paper Warning, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 6, 2014, 2:03 PM, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1567585/defying-japans-warning-chinese-ships-advance-
waters-near-diaoyus. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2583285 
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This article focuses on comparable disputes over two groups of uninhabited 
islands—the Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese) Islands and the Diaoyu (Senkaku in 
Japanese) Islands—that may be pivotal to unraveling a series of volatile maritime 
disputes between Japan and South Korea, on the one hand, and Japan and China, 
on the other.  The Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located 
respectively in the Sea of Japan (known as the East Sea in Korea) and the East 
China Sea.  This narrowing of the topic to these two particular island disputes and 
related maritime issues is offered in the hope that these two sets of disputes may 
hold some keys to the wider, more factually complex debate stretching across the 
region, both north to the Yellow Sea and south to the South China Sea.
5
  At the 
same time, there is hope the Japan-South Korea dispute may inform options 
available for the China-Japan dispute. 
In the face of the current impasse, the challenge is to identify those aspects of 
these island disputes that can be solved so as to ultimately facilitate more 
comprehensive maritime solutions that may be achieved under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).6  Toward this end, the following 
six sections will discuss: first, the posture of the current disputes; second, some 
international legal principles of relevance to the parties positions regarding 
territorial claims to uninhabited islands and resource rights in adjoining seas; third, 
the above-noted Japanese-South Korean dispute relating to the Dokdo/Takeshima 
Islands; fourth, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; fifth, 
the parties’ positions regarding the related resource boundary claims; and, sixth, 
concluding recommendations on how best to move past the current impasse.  
Paradoxically, while resource concerns triggered a lot of the recent attention to 
these disputes, nationalistic concerns over sovereignty engender more passion in 
the disputants.  The twin concern over sovereignty and resources has become an 
increasing cause of conflict in the Asian region, making settlement of resource 
claims without addressing the underlying sovereignty dispute increasingly 
difficult. 
 
 5. See generally Andy Yee, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis 
of the South China Sea and the East China Sea, 2 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 165 (2011).  Both Japan 
and South Korea have other sea resource boundary disputes with China.  See e.g., Euan Graham, South 
Korea’s Maritime Challenges: Between a Rock and a Hard Base, RSIS COMMENTARIES, No. 063/2012, 
Apr. 11, 2012, available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO12063.pdf.  The 
Sino-Korean dispute over Leo Island (actually submerged rocks) has been especially contentious.  
Terence Roehrig, South Korea-China Maritime Disputes: Toward a Solution, EASTASIAFORUM.ORG, 
Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/27/south-korea-china-maritime-disputes-toward-
a-solution; China Must Not Take Its Territorial Ambitions Too Far, CHOSUN ILBO, Sept. 26, 2012, 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/09/26/2012092601283.html; Scores of Chinese 
Fishing Boats Invade Korean Waters, CHOSUN ILBO, May 2, 
2014,http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/05/02/2014050201344.html.  Less relevant to 
the present discussion are Japanese disputes with Russia over its northern Kuril Islands.  Japan PM, 
Putin Seek Progress on Islands Dispute, ABC NEWS AUSTL., Apr. 29, 2013, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-04-29/an-japan2c-russia-discuss-islands-dispute/4658814. 
 6. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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With this in mind, the final section offers a recommendation that reverses 
both Deng Xiaoping’s earlier sage advice and the favored international practice 
under UNCLOS of interim resource settlements in the face of intractable territorial 
disputes.  Developing international customary law regarding claims to uninhabited 
islands suggests the most effective avenue to unraveling these territorial and 
maritime resource disputes is to first pay attention to peaceful resolution of the 
island and related maritime sovereignty disputes.  In the spirit of the gentle 
removal of logs from the log-jam that characterizes these disputes, this effort might 
ideally begin with third-party dispute resolution, preferably in the International 
Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 
Careful consideration of the security and other alliances between South Korea 
and Japan, as they react to China’s rise and North Korea’s aggression, may 
encourage a process to resolve historical tensions and begin to outline relative 
rights respecting these islands and the broader maritime claims.  Beyond such 
optimal approach, other lesser alternatives are also considered.  These 
recommendations recognize attempts to fully resolve the maritime resource 
disputes have been held up for decades.  Uncertainty over the islands’ claims and 
associated resource zones has spawned the back and forth posturing that inhibits 
compromise over the maritime resource claims.  The goal is to move the process 
forward toward a solution before the more aggravated military conflict, which 
many fear, ensues. 
II.  THE CURRENT POSTURE OF THE DISPUTES 
A.  Tit-for-Tat Provocations 
The past couple of years have witnessed an explosion of confrontations 
relating to sovereignty and jurisdiction over uninhabited islands and maritime 
resource zones in the East and Southeast Asian maritime areas.  The long list of 
confrontations between the parties to the present discussion have included: the 
Sino-Japanese dispute in late 2010 over the Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen 
accused of ramming a Japanese patrol boat near the Japanese-administered 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea;
7
 the 2012 Japanese arrest and quick 
release of fourteen Chinese civilians attempting to occupy Diaoyu/Senkaku, with 
follow-on Japanese civilian occupation;
8
 the September 2012 Japanese purchase of 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from a private Japanese holder (characterized by 
China as “nationalization”), which netted the largest anti-Japanese riots in China in 
decades;
9
 Chinese patrol boats frequently confronting the Japanese Coast Guard 
 
 7. Japan-China Row over Ship Seizure, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 9, 2010, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2010/09/20109963630504649.html. 
 8. Martin Fackler, Japan Holds 14 Chinese in Island Landing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/world/asia/japanese-ministers-visit-tokyo-shrine.html?_r=0. 
 9. The Chinese government appears to manage the public discontent over Japan’s purchase, first 
turning it on and then turning it off, perhaps fearing a backlash against their own government.  Keith 
Bradsher, Martin Fackler, & Andrew Jacobs, Anti-Japan Protests Erupt in China over Disputed Island, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/20/world/asia/japanese-activists-display-
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off Diaoyu/Senkaku;
10
 various threats of sanctions (under WTO “security 
exceptions”) or even war in the Chinese official press;11 Japan’s scrambling of 
fighter planes in response to Chinese warplanes flying near the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands.
12
 
That there has been a similar list of disputes in the South China Sea signals 
that the reach of this tense situation goes well beyond the immediate area to 
include: maritime patrol boat confrontations between China and its neighbors over 
the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea;
13
 disputes in 2014 over a 
Chinese drilling platform operating in waters generally thought to be in the 
Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), netting confrontations at sea and 
large Vietnamese street protest;
14
 a dispute and then a now-failed compromise 
between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal and China’s building 
of man-made islands on reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands.
15
  While the present 
essay will discuss prominent East China Sea disputes, those in the South China Sea 
are equally compelling. 
Any of these disputes risk conflagration across the region as various security 
alignments are brought into play.  Recent developments, with China employing 
 
flag-on-disputed-island.html?hp (noting the demonstrations appeared sanctioned and chaperoned by 
police).  While Beijing accuses Japan of provoking China by nationalizing the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, 
it appears the Japanese purchase from private owners was designed to avoid a purchase being 
orchestrated by the more nationalistic Tokyo governor.  Mari Yamaguchi, Tokyo Governor Says City 
will Buy Disputed Islands, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 17, 2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/tokyo-
governor-says-city-buy-150303483.html.  See also Ed Zhang, China Lays into Japan over Naming of 
Islets, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 31, 2012, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.scmp.com/article/991303/china-lays-japan-over-naming-islets. 
 10. Minnie Chan, PLA Puts Military Heat on Japan over Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1035320/pla-puts-military-
heat-japan-over-diaoyu-islands. 
 11. Jin Baisong, Consider Sanctions on Japan, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 17, 2012, 7:53 AM), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-09/17/content_15761435.htm (indicating a military 
response should be a last choice); Jane Perlez, China Alters Its Strategy in Diplomatic Crisis with 
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/asia/china-alters-its-
strategy-in-dispute-with-japan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 12. Julian Ryall, Japanese Jets Ordered to Diaoyus 160 Times in Nine Months, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013, 6:10 PM, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1136249/japanese-
jets-ordered-diaoyus-160-times-nine-months. 
 13. Ian Storey, ASEAN and the South China Sea: Movement in Lieu of Progress, CHINA BRIEF, 
Apr. 26, 2012, at 10, available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39305&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=58
9&no_cache=1#.VFrdufnF_Xt. 
 14. Edward Wong, Analysts Say China May Try to Use Manmade Islands to Bolster Bid for 
Economic Development, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014, 
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/19/analysts-say-china-may-try-to-use-manmade-islands-
to-bolster-bid-for-economic-development/; NGUYEN THI LAN ANH, XISHA (PARACEL) ISLANDS: A 
REJOINDER (2014), available at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO14117.pdf. 
 15. Kristine Kwok & Minnie Chan, China Plans Artificial Island in Disputed Spratlys Chain in 
South China Sea, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 7, 2014, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1527059/china-plans-artificial-island-disputed-spratlys-chain-
south-china-sea?page=all. 
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drones near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and declaring an Air Defense 
Identification Zone (“ADIZ”) to overlap the Japanese controlled islands, have 
raised ominous concerns about miscalculations leading to military conflict.
16
  
Chinese officials and commentators have invoked World War II history to suggest 
a rising tide of Japanese militarism.
17
  The perceived threat from a now rising 
China may appear more imminent to its neighbors. 
A common thread in many of these disputes is China’s military rise and 
consequent assertiveness.
18
  There have been threatening domestic calls for China 
to enhance its sea power in order to deal more forcefully with these challenges.
19
  
These have included what has been called a “near sea doctrine” China announced 
five years ago, where China declared an aim to exercise greater control over the 
East and South China Seas.
20
  There have in fact been several incursions by 
 
 16. Christopher Bodeen, China Warns Foreign Planes Entering Defense Zone, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Jan. 24, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/china-warns-foreign-planes-entering-defense-zone-
064540562.html; Wendell Minnick, Fact Sheet: China’s Air Defense Zone, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 2, 
2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131124/DEFREG03/311240004/Fact-Sheet-China-s-Air-
Defense-Zone; US Criticizes New China Zone, Vows to Defend Japan, SPACEWAR.COM, Nov. 23, 2013, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_criticizes_new_China_zone_vows_to_defend_Japan_999.html; 
Press Release, Ministry of Nat’l Def., PRC, Defense Spokesman Yang Yujun’s Response to Questions 
on the Establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (Nov. 23, 2013), available 
at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2013-11/23/content_4476149.htm; Chris Buckley, China Claims Air 
Rights over Disputed Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/china-warns-of-action-against-aircraft-over-disputed-
seas.html?_r=0; Former Chinese Commander Warns of War If Japan Shoots Down Drone, 
BLOOMBERG News, Nov. 4, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-04/former-chinese-
commander-warns-of-war-if-japan-shoots-down-drone.html; Martin Fackler, Japan Rejects China’s 
Claim to Air Rights Over Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/world/asia/japan-rejects-chinas-claim-to-air-rights-over-disputed-
islands.html?ref=international-home; Ely Ratner, China Undeterred and Unapologetic, 
WARONTHEROCKS.COM, June 24, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/china-undeterred-and-
unapologetic/. 
 17. Zhang Junsai, Abe’s Militarism Defies History, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 9, 2014, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/abes-militarism-defies-history/article16244968/. 
 18. Edward Wong, China Navy Reaches Far, Unsettling the Region, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15china.html?_r=0; Asia’s Balance of Power, supra 
note 3; China’s Maritime Ambitions Making Waves in Pacific, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, Aug. 10, 2013, 
3:35 AM, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/82919/chinas-maritime-ambitions-making-waves-in-pacific-
2/.  China’s inclusion of the islands among its “core interest” has also caused unease.  China Officially 
Labels Senkakus a ‘Core Interest’, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 27, 2013, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/27/national/china-officially-labels-senkakus-a-core-
interest/#.VF0B3_nF_Vo; Senkakus a ‘Core Interest,’ Chinese Military Scholar Tells Japan, JAPAN 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/20/national/politics-
diplomacy/senkakus-a-core-interest-chinese-military-scholar-tells-japan/#.VF0EO_nF_Vp; Phillip C. 
Saunders, China’s Juggling Act: Balancing Stability and Territorial Claims, PACNET No. 33 (Center 
for Strategic & Int’l Studies), Apr. 29, 2014, at 1, available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1433.pdf. 
 19. Hao Zhou, China Yet to be a Sea Power, GLOBALTIMES.CN, Mar. 23, 2012, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/701700.shtml. 
 20. Michael J. Green, Negotiating Asia’s Troubled Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/opinion/negotiating-asias-troubled-waters.html?_r=0. 
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Chinese Coast Guard, marine surveillance ships, and aircrafts near these islands 
and others in the South China Sea.
21
  A prominent Japanese retired admiral has 
even argued, beyond seabed resource claims, China’s real goal in seeking to 
control the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea is to create a 
submarine safe-zone in the South China Sea to enhance unfettered access to the 
open ocean by nuclear submarines, as a deterrent against the U.S.
22
  Others take the 
view that China is simply in a renewal phase aimed at expanding its sovereign 
territory and resurrecting its more glorious past.
23
  Whichever theory is correct, 
China’s military posturing raises risks both for the disputants and for U.S. 
involvement.
24
  Concerns about full civilian control of China’s military have 
enhanced the perceived sense of risk in military encounters at sea.
25
  Diplomatic 
efforts to contain this risk have born very little fruit.
26
 
These risks have also produced escalation on the Japanese side.  After years 
of somewhat stagnant military budgets, Japan has announced defense budget 
increases and strategic shifts to counter Chinese incursions.
27
  It has revised its 
 
 21. China’s New Coastguard Flexes Muscles near Diaoyu Islands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 
26, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1291292/chinese-coastguard-enters-japanese-
controlled-waters-raising-tensions; Three Chinese Vessels Enter Territorial Waters Near Senkakus, 
JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/28/national/three-chinese-
vessels-enter-territorial-waters-near-senkakus/#.VF0fUPnF_Vo; Barbara Demick, China Wages Stealth 
War in Asian Waters, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/27/world/la-fg-
china-maritime-20130327; Japan PM Abe Warns China of Force Over Islands Landing, BBC NEWS, 
Apr. 23, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22260140. 
 22. Reiji Yoshida, Beijing’s Senkaku Goal: Sub ‘Safe Haven’ in South China Sea, JAPAN TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/07/national/beijings-senkaku-goal-sub-safe-
haven-in-south-china-sea/. 
 23. John Lee, China’s Dream of Rebirth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1166737/chinas-dream-rebirth?page=all; Holly 
Morrow, It’s Not About the Oil—It’s About the Tiny Rocks, FOREIGN POL’Y, Aug. 4, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/04/it_s_not_about_the_oil_it_s_about_the_tiny_rocks_c
hina_south_china_sea_japan_vietnam (arguing that these disputes are not about oil but are primarily 
about sovereignty). 
 24. John Pomfret, Japan and China’s Island Argument is a U.S. Concern, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/japan-and-chinas-island-argument-is-a-us-
concern/2013/02/05/fbc7ed62-6999-11e2-af53-7b2b2a7510a8_story.html; U.S. Airs Concern over 
China’s Radar Locking on Japanese Defense Ship, ASIA NEWS MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2013; Insight: China 
Increased Belligerence after U.S. Aircraft Deployment near Senkakus, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Feb. 6, 2013, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/AJ201302060077. 
 25. Masahiro Matsumura, Praetorian China?, PROJECT-SYNDICATE.ORG (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-s-loss-of-civilian-control-over-the-military-by-
masahiro-matsumura. 
 26. Showing Off to the World, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21631107-capital-about-host-president-xi-jinpings-diplomatic-
coming-out-party-showing. 
 27. Yuka Hayashi, Japanese General Seeks to Reinforce Defenses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324581504578238473997165346; see generally 
JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2013 (2013), available at 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2013.html) (reflecting a shift in defense interest from the North 
to the islands in the Southwest). 
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defense strategy to focus its forces more to the south to defend against potential 
Chinese attacks on its islands.
28
  Japan has also stepped up efforts to develop a 
stealth fighter jet to match the J-20 stealth fighter recently tested by China.
29
  Japan 
has engaged in war games and placed missiles on nearby Pacific gateway islands.
30
  
It has also attempted to contain the problem by reaching a separate agreement with 
the Republic of China (“ROC”) to allow Taiwanese fishermen to fish near the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands just beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea boundary.
31
 
Some disputants have lodged formal protests or other submissions to the 
United Nations.  In Southeast Asia, these complaints relate to China’s allegedly 
excessive resource claims and the so-called “nine dotted lines” claim to most of the 
South China Sea.
32
  China has reacted to the most aggressive of these, relating to 
the filing by the Philippines, by refusing to participate and put forth its own 
arbitrator, requiring the President of the U.N. Tribunal to select a judge on behalf 
of China.
33
  After the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku crises, China instituted its own filing 
 
 28. See Hayashi, supra note 27. 
 29. David Axe, Japan’s Stealth Fighter Gambit, DIPLOMAT, June 23, 2011, 
http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/japans-stealth-fighter-gambit/?allpages=yes. 
 30. Japan putting Missiles on Pacific Gateway Islands, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM, Nov. 7, 2013, 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/specialreports/mh370/news/japan-putting-missiles-
on/878190.html. 
 31. China Angered as Japan, Taiwan Sign Fishing Agreement, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/10/us-china-japan-taiwan-idUSBRE93909520130410; Minnie 
Chan, Taiwan Would ‘Expel’ Mainland Trawlers under Japan Fishing Deal, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Apr. 10, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1211568/china-angered-japan-taiwan-sign-
fishing-agreement?page=all. 
 32. Though China has formally opted out of compulsory jurisdiction for maritime boundaries and 
military activities, as permitted under UNCLOS, the Philippines has filed a claim under UNCLOS to 
Scarborough Shoal (known as Huangyan Island in China).  China Rejects Manila Claims over South 
China Shoal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 18, 2012, 
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2018004165_apassouthchinasea.html.  Beyond these island 
disputes there are numerous issues related to China’s hotly disputed claims to nearly all of the South 
China Seas within the infamous “nine dotted lines”, which Wang Gungwu traces to China’s attempted 
accession of Japanese imperial claims following World War II.  Wang Gungwu, China and the Map of 
Nine Dotted Lines, STRAITS TIMES, July 11, 2012, http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-
report/china/story/china-and-the-map-nine-dotted-lines-20120711. 
 33. Greg Torode, For South China Sea Claimants, a Legal Venue to Battle China, REUTERS, Feb. 
12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/us-china-vietnam-idUSBREA1C04R20140213.  
The arbitration judicial panel was fully constituted on April 24, 2013, to include judges from Sri Lanka 
(president), France, Germany, Netherlands, and Poland.  See Greg Torode, Manila to Tackle Sea Row 
‘With or Without China’ at UN, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1154951/manila-tackle-sea-row-or-without-china-un; Verna 
Yu, Beijing Looks Like A ‘Bully’ By Refusing Arbitration of South China Sea, S. CHINA MORNING 
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with the U.N., indicating its base points and strait baselines to claim territorial seas 
and possibly associated resource zones for the disputed islands.
34
  China has since 
proclaimed its intention to patrol claimed areas now under the administration of 
other states.
35
  Such Chinese proclamations have included reported regulations on 
vessels in China’s territorial seas, issued by the responsible Hainan People’s 
Congress.
36
  It has been argued that enforcement of such regulations through 
seizure of a foreign vessel may open China up to the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”), which has disavowed 
jurisdiction in maritime delimitation disputes.
37
  These official Chinese actions, in 
conjunction with official encouragement of anti-Japanese demonstrations, not to 
mention encouragement for Chinese fishing and patrol vessels to enter the disputed 
areas, surely contribute to a volatile situation.
38
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 35. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Dangerous Waters, Why China’s Dispute with Japan is More 
Dangerous than You Think, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept. 17, 2012, 
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The discussion of these maritime disputes in several international forums 
signals enhanced likelihood of further confrontation.  Discussions at the March 
2012 meeting of China’s National People’s Congress tended to show China’s 
determination to press its maritime claims with even greater determination.
39
  As 
President Obama restated in Tokyo in April 2014, the U.S. is committed to defend 
Diaoyu/Senkaku under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security.
40
  This frequently stated commitment, endorsed by congressional 
resolution in late 2012, no doubt contributes to the military risk associated with 
this issue.
41
  Japan’s hedging against China’s volatile threats also includes 
increased security alignments with other threatened states.
42
  While there have 
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been calls to prepare for war on both sides, the majority opinion is that China and 
Japan will not risk an all-out war.
43
 
Efforts to contain the dispute have also been evident.  In August 2012, the 
Beijing government asked that the Japanese government follow “three no’s”: 
Japanese nationals should not land on the disputed islands, Japan should not 
develop resources around the island, and Japan should not construct any buildings 
on the islands.
44
  Internet users in China attacked the government for being weak.
45
  
In late 2013, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, speaking before the U.N. 
General Assembly, sought to cool down these intense disputes by re-invoking 
Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum about the time not now being ripe to address 
these issues, though he insisted Japan at least acknowledge the dispute.
46
  In 2014 
Washington, Manila, Beijing, and Tokyo backed a code of conduct to prevent 
conflict at sea that has tried to reduce the discussed risks by banning radar-locking 
of weaponry and setting out a reporting mechanism when naval vessels meet 
unexpectedly in sea lanes.
47
 
The danger of Sino-Japanese military miscalculation has, nevertheless, 
become increasingly evident in the tit-for-tat military moves of both sides.  China 
viewed the Japanese arrest of fishing boat captains in Japanese-claimed waters and 
the naming of the islands claimed by China as provocative.
48
  China has increased 
official patrols near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, enhancing the risk of 
confrontation.
49
  On two occasions, the Chinese were reported to have locked 
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weapons-guiding radar on Japanese vessels, accompanied by Chinese denials.
50
  
There have also been reports of China using drones to defend its claims in the East 
China Sea and reports of China’s intentions to increase patrols even further, to 
which Japan is likewise preparing defensive measures.
51
 
What started with the Japanese government reaching agreement with the 
private Japanese owners to buy and nationalize the islands, to head off plans of 
Japanese right-wing politicians, garnered a heated Chinese response and has 
escalated into the central dispute between these two trading partners.
52
  The 
Chinese government hardly appreciated the Japanese official’s motive to 
undermine a purchase by the more right-wing Governor of Tokyo, who would 
surely have engaged in other provocative acts on the islands.
53
  China sometimes 
characterizes its claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as “core 
national interests,” suggesting non-negotiability, which has carried a menacing 
tone.
54
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While the Japanese dispute with South Korea over Dokdo/Takashima has 
been comparably less volatile, there have been tense moments and concern about 
Japan-Korean defense alignments.  While Japan is in possession of 
Senkaku/Diaoyu, South Korea is in possession of Dokdo/Takeshima.
55
  The 
Japanese Government took a dim view of the South Korean President paying a 
personal visit to Dokdo/Takeshima.
56
  These South Korean initiatives have 
seemingly encouraged China to seek alignment with South Korea against Japan.
57
 
These disputes have also reached beyond the immediate disputants, affecting 
the security posture throughout the region.  The U.S. defense obligations towards 
Japan and South Korea along with tit-for-tat confrontations with China over U.S. 
warship passage through these seas have raised the temperature.
58
  Vietnam and the 
Philippines have beefed up their defenses in response to perceived Chinese 
provocations
59
 that all parties are increasingly likely to arrest the others’ fishermen 
in claimed waters, which signals greater urgency across the region.
60
  The risk of 
hot war from continuing failure to resolve certain territorial and resource claims in 
the region is evident.  Numerous efforts at discussion between the disputants have 
not so far produced results.
61
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B.  Framing the Disputes 
While the general fact of China’s emergence as a great power may naturally 
give rise to security concerns among China’s neighbors, there can be little doubt 
that peace would be better served by the elimination of risky disputes over 
uninhabited islands and their surrounding seas.  In regard to the disputes addressed 
in this article, the cost of a war-like footing or war itself among three developed or 
rapidly developing nations—China, Japan, and South Korea (along with the 
U.S.)—would be enormous.  The intra-Chinese dispute over Taiwan, while adding 
further complexity, is set aside here, assuming some shared “Chinese” interests in 
and mutual assertion of Chinese territorial claims on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait.
62
  The three states to be discussed primarily—China, Japan, and South 
Korea—are all U.N. members and parties to the 1982 UNCLOS.63  Contributing to 
this tense situation has been a tendency of all three states, especially China and 
Japan, to push claims to base lines and related inland seas, territorial seas, and 
resource zones that clearly go beyond those contemplated by UNCLOS.  Without 
clearly knowing who first started this cycle of confrontation and excess, the 
strategy of all appears to be aimed at creating strong bargaining chips as a 
counterweight to the other side’s perceived excess claims.  This brew of excess 
claims and bargaining chips leads to ever-rising escalation of the disputes. 
Earlier, in the spirit of Deng Xiaoping’s above statement about the wisdom of 
setting aside such sovereignty disputes and in the shadow of UNCLOS, it was 
anticipated that temporary joint resource development zones and fisheries could be 
negotiated while leaving the sensitive claims to uninhabited islands—territorial 
land claims not being addressed in UNCLOS—for future resolution.  This strategy 
has proven largely fruitless, especially as to the vast oil and gas resources—with 
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2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1331106/china-vietnam-set-group-explore-disputed-
south-china-sea; Okudera, supra note 46. 
 62. Taiwan has indeed piped in occasionally to make its concerns known.  Lawrence Chung, We 
Vow Not to Give In Even an Inch, Taiwanese President Ma Tells Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Sept. 14, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1036214/we-vow-not-give-even-inch-
taiwanese-president-ma-tells-japan. 
 63. When China signed and ratified UNCLOS it indicated several exceptions to its acceptance of 
the treaty, including specifically that nothing in its accession should be construed to conflict in any way 
with China’s territorial law.  Query whether this includes its claims within the nine dotted lines to the 
entire South China Sea and too much of the continental shelf under the East China Sea?  UNCLOS does 
not include island claims.  It is important to note that the U.S., though often a participant in these 
disputes, is not yet a party to UNCLOS, though there has been pressure for U.S. ratification.  Mark 
Landler, Law of the Sea Treaty is Found on Capitol Hill, Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/americas/law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-found-on-capitol-hill-
again.html. 
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only moderate contingent and not fully realized progress in a couple cases.
64
  The 
reluctance of each party to surrender the leverage of their bargaining chips, which 
ultimately include uninhabited islands and the surrounding seas, has spawned an 
impasse.  Added to these strategic considerations has been a strong dose of 
nationalist sentiments on all sides agitating to defend the sovereign territorial 
claims represented by the islands.
65
  The Chinese government has been especially 
tolerant (some say encouraging of) public anti-Japanese demonstrations.
66
  Perry 
Link has noted that this may be a dangerous game for China; if such 
demonstrations get out of hand they may backfire, turning the public wrath on 
China itself.
67
 
This situation leaves the parties with a strategic log-jam and the question 
whether any logs can be gently removed from the disputes without collapsing into 
a state of war.  As the level of volatility has increased over time, the urgency of 
this matter has increased.  With some limited fishery exceptions, proposals to ease 
the risk of conflict and settle the resource disputes have not yet been fruitful.
68
  
That failure has led to the effort in this article to turn the process around and 
consider avenues to addressing the more volatile island disputes first. 
Absent the nationalistic passions, the claims to sovereignty over disputed 
islands by all sides are coherent enough and could be easily resolved on the merits 
under now-established customary international law through some third-party 
dispute mechanism.  Regarding Senkaku/Diaoyu, the impasse has long been the 
refusal of both China and Japan to submit the dispute for third-party arbitration or 
for Japan to even acknowledge there is a dispute to address.  In the 2012 speech of 
 
 64. Seima Oki, China Vessels Hold Drills Near Gas Fields, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Mar. 19, 2012, 
http://china.timesofnews.com/china-vessels-hold-drill-near-gas-fields/; Japan Protests to China Over 
Undersea Gas Drilling, TOKYO TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.tokyotimes.com/japan-protests-to-
china-over-undersea-gas-drilling. 
 65. Song Wenzhou, Nationalists Pose a Problem for Two Nations, CAIXIN ONLINE (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://english.caixin.com/2013-12-06/100614547.html. 
 66. William Wan, Beijing Both Encourages and Reins in Anti-Japan Protests, Analysts Say, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-both-encourages-and-
reins-in-anti-japan-protests-analysts-say/2012/09/17/dc8c188e-0188-11e2-9367-
4e1bafb958db_story.html?wprss=rss_asia-pacific; Jessica Weiss, Nationalism and Anti-Japan 
Demonstrations in China, MONKEY CAGE (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/09/19/nationalism-and-anti-japan-demonstrations-in-china/.  
China’s encouragement of nationalistic demonstrations has been evident in China’s ability to turn on 
and off such demonstrations.  China Tells Citizens not to hold Anti-Japan Protests, KYODO NEWS, Sept. 
19, 2012, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/UPDATE1%3A+China+tells+citizens+not+to+hold+anti-
Japan+protests.-a0303222919.  Such nationalism has especially been stoked by lingering sentiment 
about Japan’s invasions in World War II. 
 67. Perry Link, Beijing’s Dangerous Game, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Sept. 20, 2012, 11:45 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/sep/20/beijings-dangerous-game.  See also June Teufel 
Dreyer, The Sino Stranglehold: How Badly Could the Chinese Protests Hurt Japan’s Economy?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept. 21, 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/21/the_sino_stranglehold. 
 68. Teddy Ng, Japanese Propose Plan to Avoid Maritime Conflicts, Foreign Minister Seeks 
Endorsements from Wen Jiabao and Wants to Resume Talks on Gas Fields, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Nov. 24, 2011,  http://www.scmp.com/article/985738/japanese-propose-plan-avoid-maritime-conflicts. 
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then Japanese Prime Minister Noda before the General Assembly he invoked 
international law and seemingly signaled a willingness to submit the matter for 
third-party arbitration, but China’s long-standing refusal may have made this no 
more than a safe ploy.
69
  More recently, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
invocation of the rule of law as a basis to address these disputes met with Chinese 
condemnation.
70
  China has never filed a general submission to the ICJ and has 
especially resisted application of the ICJ or other third-party dispute mechanisms 
for resolving disputes over sovereignty in similar circumstances.
71
  Respecting 
Dokdo/Takeshima, South Korea likewise refuses such third-party dispute 
assistance, claiming sovereignty as a justification.
72
  Japan has indicated a 
willingness to submit the matter to the ICJ.
73
 
Because China, Japan, and South Korea are within 400 nautical miles (“nm”) 
of each other, all claimed resource zones in these enclosed seas overlap and require 
the parties to negotiate an “equitable solution” as is required under UNCLOS.74  
The claiming of excessive strait baselines from which to measure the territorial 
seas by both Japan and China does not contribute to efforts to find such a solution.  
In 2012, Beijing spurred increased tension by submitting to the U.N. strait 
baselines for the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.
75
  Added to the impasse is the seeming 
Japanese reluctance to openly accept that it cannot claim the 200nm resource zones 
under UNCLOS for the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, a limitation both 
 
 69. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda United Nations General Assembly Address, CSPAN 
(Sept. 26, 2012), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?308405-4/japanese-prime-minister-
yoshihiko-noda-united-nations-general-assembly-address; Time to Put Inferiority Complex Behind Us, 
GLOBAL TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/735883.shtml. 
 70. Japan, Philiippines Using Rule of Law Pretext: China, XINHUA, June 27, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-06/27/c_133443927.htm. 
 71. For example, its refusal of such third party dispute jurisdiction occurred when the Philippines 
brought a similar dispute over the Scarborough Shoal in the Spratly Islands to the International Tribunal 
on the Law of the Sea.  See, e.g., China Says Philippines Violates International Maritime Law in 
Claiming South China Shoal, FOX NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/18/china-claims-philippines-is-violating-maritime-law/; 
Samantha Hoffman, Sino-Philippine Tension and Trade Both Rising amid Scarborough Standoff, 
CHINA BRIEF, vol. 12/9, Apr. 27, 2012, available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_04_27.pdf; Greg Torode, Manila Action of South China 
Sea Could Risk Aggravating Disputes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1136191/manilas-action-over-south-china-sea-could-risk-
aggravating-disputes. 
 72. See generally PILKYU KIM, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY BETWEEN JAPAN AND KOREA IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Xlibris, 2014). 
 73. J. Berkshire Miller, The ICJ and the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute, DIPLOMAT (May 13, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-icj-and-the-dokdotakeshima-dispute/. 
 74. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 74 and 83. 
 75. This move was seen as a shift away from the previous policy of setting aside the dispute and 
negotiating over joint exploration for energy resources and the declaration was accompanied by 
increased presents of Chinese surveillance ships in the area.  Teddy Ng, Beijing Gives UN Baselines for 
Diaoyu Islands, Spurring Tension with Japan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 15, 2012, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1037254/beijing-gives-un-baselines-diaoyu-islands-spurring-
tension-japan. 
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China and Taiwan have acknowledged.
76
  But perhaps the biggest log in the log-
jam is China’s claim to nearly all of the continental shelf between China and Japan 
as part of what it claims is a natural prolongation of the continental shelf—even 
though UNCLOS does not appear to allow such option in this situation of opposite 
states within four hundred nautical miles of each other.
77
  China’s similarly 
excessive claim to nearly all of the South China Sea certainly does not encourage 
hope that it would readily abandon this excessive claim in favor of a more 
equitable solution.
78
  Efforts have been made by all sides to negotiate cooperative 
arrangements in the form of joint resource zones envisioned by UNCLOS but with 
limited success in implementation.
79
 
The pending island disputes have left the parties with too much uncertainty to 
judge the reasonableness of any proposed resource allocation under UNCLOS 
guidelines.  Before UNCLOS South Korea and Japan were successful at 
negotiating a joint resource development zone and they have since reached a 
fisheries agreement.
80
  While China and Japan managed to reach a tentative 
understanding, they labeled a “principled consensus,” in June 2008 calling for joint 
exploration and possible joint resource development in a 2700 square kilometer 
area in the East China Sea, it is not clear whether this arrangement will be fully 
developed and carried out—there being considerable mutual distrust.81  Japan and 
China did reach a joint fisheries agreement covering a large area but excluding the 
 
 76. JON M. VAN DYKE, MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE 
LAW OF THE SEA 61-62 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 58.  China has submitted this continental shelf prolongation to the U.N. in a submission 
entitled “Partial Submission Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200nm in the 
East China Sea.”  China Makes U.N. Appeal for Maritime Claim, UPI, Dec.17, 2012, 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/12/17/China-makes-UN-appeal-for-maritime-claim/UPI-
60871355720880/. 
 78. South China Sea, Full Unclosure?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21551113/print. 
 79. Keyuan Zou, Sino-Japanese Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea, 27 Marine 
Pol’y 125, 132-40 (2003) (includes the translated agreement as an appendix). 
 80. Choon-Ho Park, Seabed Boundary Issues in the East China Sea, in Seabed Petroleum in 
Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation? 18, 18-22 (Selig S. Harrison ed., Woodrow Wilson Int’l. Ctr. 
for Scholars, 2005), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Asia_petroleum.pdf.  
The Japan-Republic of Korea Agreement on Fisheries of 28 November 1998, entered into force on 22 
January 1999, as revised on 17 March 1999. 
 81. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Remarks on the Principled Consensus Reached between China and 
Japan on the East China Sea (June 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t466675.shtml; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Masahiko Koumura and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Mari (June 18, 2008), 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fmpress/2008/6/0618.html (regarding Cooperation 
Between Japan and China in the East China Sea).  The tentative nature of the June 18, 2008 “principled 
consensus” was reflected in even the announcements of the arrangement being made in separate press 
conferences and the arrangement itself leaving much open for further discussion, though it does provide 
for cooperation in exploration and some joint investments. 
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waters below twenty-seven degrees north near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
82
  A 
comprehensive resolution of these problems in the most sensitive areas seems to 
elude the parties, as they fear surrendering critical bargaining chips, the disputed 
islands being the most visible.  Do current international legal principles offer a way 
out of these impasses? 
III.  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: AN OVERVIEW 
In the context of both sets of island disputes under discussion, the parties are 
claiming historical title to the islands themselves and claiming rights to maritime 
resources, including fisheries and oil, and gas deposits in the adjoining seas 
between the claimant states.
83
  Because the states in question are in close proximity 
across their adjoining seas and the islands are at intermediate locations, the island 
disputes have long been contingent factors for resolving the maritime disputes.  
The discovery of very large oil and gas reserves—some have speculated possibly 
on the scale of the Middle East or the North Sea—and disputes over the maritime 
rights that attach to such small islands have created a web of competing claims.
84
  
This complex web of claims has often featured the disputed islands and various 
baseline claims as bargaining chips in the maze of competing resource claims, 
making resolution of claims that would be relatively easy to resolve in legal terms 
quite difficult.  Elements of nationalism over the island claims have elevated the 
political sensitivity of these disputes in ways that make political compromise hard 
to achieve.  The challenge has been to unravel these disputes to permit 
development of sorely needed resources. 
In regard to the disputes over these uninhabited islands and the associated 
maritime boundary and resource claims under present discussion, two rapidly 
evolving bodies of international law are implicated: territorial claims to 
uninhabited islands, though not addressed by UNCLOS, are addressed by 
customary international law; and, the maritime boundary and resource claims, 
which are addressed rather comprehensively by UNCLOS and associated 
jurisprudence.  These two areas are considered in the following subsections. 
A.  Customary International Law Relating to Sovereignty over Uninhabited 
Islands 
Taking up island disputes first, it is a common characteristic of these disputes 
over remote uninhabited islands in East Asia that a current occupant or claimant 
vies for sovereignty with other claimants based on assertions of historical title.  In 
the absence of guiding international treaties, this issue has been governed by 
 
 82. Zou, supra note 79, at 133. 
 83. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 76; KIM, supra note 72. 
 84. While some have worried that the resource claims are exaggerated, they clearly do shape and 
encourage territorial claims.  Cary Huang, Diaoyu Islands Dispute about Resources Not Land, S. China 
Morning Post, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1096774/diaoyu-islands-dispute-
about-resources-not-land.  See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., East China Sea (2012), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/east_china_sea/east_china_sea.pdf; Roach, supra note 34, 
at 1-5. 
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customary international law.  Measuring the viability of competing claims has long 
involved sifting through remote historical records.  As a result, the customary law 
regarding territorial disputes over uninhabited islands is an area of law peculiarly 
suited to resolution by the ICJ or international arbitral tribunals, although such 
referral has proven especially sensitive for Asian states. 
A number of guiding customary international law principles regarding 
territorial claims to uninhabited islands have evolved through case law in recent 
years.  Such claims often implicate issues of historical discovery and effective 
occupation.  In the colonial period, for previously unclaimed islands (belonging to 
no one, characterized as “terra nullius”), discovery and some formal official act to 
perfect a claim of sovereignty were generally thought sufficient to establish a 
claim.
85
  Because the pre-modern Asian international order may have lacked a 
concept of territorial sovereignty, as this concept is understood today,
86
 further 
difficulty was added to assessing such historical claims by regimes, which may 
have lacked a habit to formally assert such claims.  This difficulty was made worse 
by an historical lack of serious interest in such remote islands in the days when 
they offered fewer accessible resources.
87
 
By the mid-twentieth century the colonial era principles that rewarded 
Western discovery began to fade.  Modern international principles that rejected 
colonialism and embraced modern notions of state sovereignty tended to give little 
weight to ambiguous claims of historical title based on mere discovery or 
proximity.
88
  A series of judicial decisions emphasized “effective occupation,” 
which required some acts of administration and control beyond discovery.
89
  In the 
Pedra Branca case, the ICJ emphasized “effective administration” in awarding the 
island to Singapore.
90
  Effective administration can involve things such as 
reclamations, regulation of fishing, construction and maintenance of structures, and 
the investigation of accidents. 
As one commentator emphasized, “active occupation and effective control 
over territory supersedes ambiguous ancient title.”91  In the Sovereignty Over 
Pulau Ligiton and Pulau Sipadan case, a dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia 
over a group of very small islands encompassing just 0.13 square kilometers, the 
 
 85. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 47-49, 61. 
 86. Pilkyu Kim, Reassessment of Korea-Japan Relations: Acquisition of Dokdo/Takeshima and 
“Effectiveness,” Address Before the International Symposium on Dokdo Island (May 7, 2009)in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INT’L DOKDO SYMPOSIUM 2009, at 40-44; Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese 
Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 
221, 242-43 (1973-1974). 
 87. Cheng, supra note 86, at 246. 
 88. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 47-49, 61. 
 89. See Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), Judgment, 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Sovereignty Over 
Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.) (1931), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 390 (1932); Island of Palmas 
(U.S. v. Neth.), 11 R.I.A.A. 831 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1925). 
 90. Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau BatuPuteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge 
(Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 170-72 (May 23). 
 91. Alexander M. Peterson, Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: A Lasting 
Arrangement? 42 Cornell Int’l L.J. 441, 451 (2009). 
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ICJ held that mere discovery was not enough, that “effective occupation,” 
including displays of sovereignty and administration were essential to prove 
ownership.
92
  The ICJ further held that failure to protest another state’s occupation 
is de facto acceptance.
93
  The Court found effective occupation based on a 
“continued display of authority [that] involves two elements each of which must be 
shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise 
or display of such authority.”94 
As Greg Austin summarizes it, “[i]nternational customary law recognizes 
acquisition of title to territory belonging to no-one (terra nullius) through 
discovery, but this title remains inchoate and must be converted to a more 
complete title through continued, peaceful and unprotested exercise of 
sovereignty.”95  Merely showing that some private nationals of the claiming state, 
such as fishermen, visited the islands from time to time would be insufficient.
96
  
Austin notes that you can weigh the relative strength of competing historical 
claims through analysis of historical, geographical, and administrative 
circumstances.
97
  Case law also emphasizes a “critical date,” such that acts affected 
after the joining of a dispute cannot have a bearing on the sovereignty claim.
98
  
This “critical date” aspect, for example, would limit China’s ability to perfect its 
claims to contested islands in the South China Sea by building platforms or other 
occupation activities. 
Scholars and officials in East Asia often raise an irredentist problem, 
questioning whether the heightened standards of “effective occupation” should be 
applied to claims that arose in an earlier historical period before the West arrived 
on the Asian scene.
99
  Such critics favor the application of standards contemporary 
to the time the claim arose.
100
  But this argument raises a policy problem for 
current tribunals about whether to give effect to either colonialist or imperialist 
standards that applied at the time of alleged ancient discovery.  The better view 
appears to require that some standards of effective occupation be applied even to 
claims originating in ancient times.  Ancient claims also face a problem of proof 
 
 92. Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligiton and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 
625 (Dec. 17). 
 93. Id. ¶ 148. 
 94. Id. ¶ 134. 
 95. GREG AUSTIN, CHINA’S OCEAN FRONTIER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, MILITARY FORCE AND 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 36 (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1998).  In this context terra nullius generally 
refers to territory not ruled by a recognized state, which could be the consequence of no previous 
discovery and claim or abandonment of a previous claim. 
 96. Pulau Sipadan, 2002 I.C.J. ¶ 140. 
 97. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 36-40. 
 98. Id. at 40.  Austin notes that in the Island of Palmas Case the critical date was not when the 
dispute arose but when it became “crystallized,” when the parties “are no longer negotiating or 
protesting, or attempting to persuade one another.”  Rather, they have taken up positions and are 
standing on their respective rights.  Id. 
 99. Tao Cheng, supra note 86, at 2642-43. 
 100. Id. 
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that a modern tribunal may be reluctant to address.  Claims to the uninhabited 
islands addressed herein face nearly all of these challenges. 
B.  Maritime Resource Boundaries under UNCLOS 
Though UNCLOS does not address the island sovereignty claims, it is highly 
relevant in regard to the related maritime resource boundary disputes.  UNCLOS 
governs the allowance of territorial seas and other resource zones associated with 
all coastal areas, including islands.
101
  With research showing major oil and gas 
reserves, as well as rich fishery zones, at or near both sets of islands, UNCLOS and 
its various authoritative interpretations offer very useful guidance toward resolving 
these testy disputes.
102
  UNCLOS allows states to claim four designated maritime 
zones relevant to the present disputes: the inland sea, the territorial sea, the EEZ, 
and the continental shelf.
103
  Air Defense Identification Zones, as has recently been 
proclaimed by China, are not covered by UNCLOS or other maritime treaties.
104
  
The area beyond these four zones is the high seas, where navigational freedom of 
seas prevails and seabed resources are treated as part of the common heritage of 
mankind.
105
 
Where various baselines and boundaries are drawn, in the East China Sea and 
the Sea of Japan, will have large implications for the major associated resource 
claims involved in the disputes under consideration here.  The rights to the 
disputed islands and the associated resource rights will likewise implicate the 
resource boundaries that emanate outward from base lines.  The widely varied 
consequences, in respect to various possible outcomes of the island sovereignty 
disputes, explains the difficulty of reaching provisional cooperative arrangements 
with regard to the maritime resource disputes: as disputants are reluctant to 
embrace a tentative agreement that appears to presume a particular territorial 
outcome. 
Under UNCLOS, baselines are generally drawn at the low tide mark on land 
and strait baselines are allowed where the coast is “deeply indented” or has a 
“fringe of islands.”106  Coastal areas may include islands as base points in a strait-
baseline delineation only where the resulting baselines do “not depart to any 
 
 101. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 6. 
 102. See VAN DYKE, supra note 76; AUSTIN, supra note 95.  While all three disputants in the 
present discussion have signed and ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. has only signed but not ratified the 
treaty, though the U.S. long ago proclaimed it adhered to all of its provisions except those respecting 
deep sea bed minerals and their management.  The matter was recently again before the U.S. Senate to 
consider ratification, which key Republicans have long opposed.  See Mark Landler, Law of the Sea 
Treaty Is Found on Capitol Hill, Again, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/americas/law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-found-on-capitol-hill-
again.html?_r=0.  The U.S. lack of ratification no doubt weakens its leverage in pushing others to 
settlement of disputes under its terms. 
 103. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 2, 8, 55-56, 76, 86-87. 
 104. Peter A. Dutton, Caelum Liberum: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign 
Airspace 103 Am. J. Int’l L. 691, 694 (2009). 
 105. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 86-87. 
 106. Id. art. 7(1). 
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appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast.”107  Archipelagic states, 
which for Japan include the Ryukyu Islands archipelago to the south of Japan 
encompassing most of the area opposite to China, are allowed to draw strait 
baselines “joining the outermost points of outermost islands.”108 
Under UNCLOS, internal waters include those sea areas inland from 
baselines and the territorial sea and other zones emanate outward from the base 
line.
109
  UNCLOS allows up to 12nm for territorial seas.
110
  This applies both to 
islands and continental coasts and is fully under the sovereignty of the coastal 
state.
111
  States are also allowed to claim up to 200nm of EEZ from the same 
baselines, where such states have exclusive rights in fisheries and other natural 
resources.
112
  The 200nm EEZ is likewise provided in relation to both continental 
and island coasts.
113
  A continental shelf of up to 200nm and, in some cases where 
the natural prolongation extends further, up to 350nm, is allowed.
114
  Under this 
provision, all states, regardless of the contours of their continental slope, are 
entitled to at least a 200nm continental shelf, with an exception for opposite or 
adjoining states with less than 400nm between them.
115
 
For opposite or adjoining states with potentially overlapping resource 
jurisdiction, UNCLOS requires parties to reach an agreement “on the basis of 
international law in order to reach an equitable solution” in delimiting resource 
zone boundaries.
116
  While the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case spoke of 
natural prolongation,
117
 the adoption of UNCLOS Articles 74(1) and 83(1) suggest 
an agreement on “equitable” boundaries; in tandem with Article 76(1), this has 
brought about the effective demise of this notion for opposite states within 400nm 
of each other.
118
  The ICJ made this clear in the 1985 Libya v. Malta case, stating: 
Since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental 
shelf appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, whatever 
the geological characteristics of the corresponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no 
reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical factors within that distance 
either in verifying the legal title of the states concerned or in proceeding to a 
delimitation as between their claims.119 
 
 107. Id. art. 7(3). 
 108. Id. art. 47(1). 
 109. Id. art. 8. 
 110. Id. art. 3. 
 111. Id. arts. 2, 4-5. 
 112. Id. art. 57. Islands are entitled to a territorial sea, an EEZ, and a continental shelf “in 
accordance with the provisions . . . applicable to other land territory.” Id. art. 121(2). 
 113. Id. arts. 57, 60-61, 74. 
 114. Id. art. 76. 
 115. Id. arts. 76(1), 74. 
 116. Id. arts. 74, 83. 
 117. North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Ger. v. Den./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20). 
 118. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58. 
 119. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 39 (June 3).  The case involved a similar 
situation to China and Japan, with a continental state (Libya) and an opposite offshore island state 
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An equitable solution also appears to take account of proportionality in regard 
to the relative length of the opposing coastlines.  Jon Van Dyke points out that, 
while the starting point seems to be equidistant or median lines, tribunals will 
make adjustments, as they did in the Libya v. Malta case, to bring the ratio of the 
relative length of coastlines more into line with the maritime space allocated.
120
 
Of particular relevance to the present discussion of uninhabited islands, 
UNCLOS Article 121(3) provides, “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation 
or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf,” though such islands are entitled to a territorial sea.121  A precise definition 
of what would be a mere rock is not afforded, though both island groups under 
present discussion potentially fall under this provision.
122
  Is an island that has 
grass and trees growing on it but has never been used for normal human habitation 
a mere rock under this provision?  There is certainly a policy argument that such 
designation would greatly reduce associated disputes. 
With little agreement over rights to either the uninhabited islands or the 
boundaries of the maritime resource zones at issue, the earlier decision of all 
parties to set aside the island territorial disputes and work on cooperative use of 
resources under UNCLOS seemed practical.  UNCLOS encourages “provisional 
cooperative arrangements.”123  With continuing disagreement over such islands 
and only limited often-unrealizable cooperation concerning resource areas, 
especially between China and its potential partners, this approach has proven a 
failure.  These island disputes, along with disagreement over baselines and 
respective rights in the continental shelf, have given rise to the current impasse and 
related security concerns.  That uninhabited islands are involved, and not merely 
 
(Malta).  A state not facing an opposite state within 400nm can sometimes justify an extended 
continental shelf based on natural prolongation or appurtenant to islands, as was recognized by the U.N. 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf with respect to Japanese claims to uncontested areas 
in April 2012.  See UN Approves Japan’s Claim on Wider Areas, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Apr. 29, 2012, 
http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20120429-342721.html (netting 
Japan 310,000 square kilometers). 
 120. Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. ¶¶ 11, 64-65; VAN DYKE, supra note 77, at 59.  See also Gulf of 
Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the 
Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14); Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40, at 111 (Mar. 16).  See 
also Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar in 
the Bay of Bengal (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, ITLOS Rep. 1, ¶ 319, 
available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1-
C16_Judgment_14_02_2012.pdf (reflecting that St. Martin’s Island got no EEZ based on such 
adjustment in competition with an opposite continental land, even though the island was substantial 
with 3,700 permanent residents). 
 121. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 121(3). 
 122. Sourabh Gupta has pointed out that some very small uninhabited islands have been the subject 
of valid or pending claims for an EEZ and a continental shelf, including Japan’s low-lying 
Okinotorishima, the very small U.S. Howland and Baker Islands, and Australia’s remote Heard and 
McDonald Islands.  Sourabh Gupta, Murky Waters Surround the Rule of Law in the South China Sea, 
East Asia Forum (July 20, 2014), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/07/20/murky-waters-surround-
the-rule-of-law-in-the-south-china-sea/. 
 123. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 74, 83. 
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maritime resource claims, has also encouraged nationalist passions that give 
priority to sovereignty claims and make legal settlements difficult.  Compromise, 
even in areas where the law seems clear, has eluded the parties, as they fear 
surrendering any claim that may possibly serve as a bargaining chip in dealing 
with other issues.  An assessment of Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyu 
respectively in the next two sections is followed in the third section below by an 
assessment of the parties’ related resource boundary claims and agreements. 
IV.  SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE DOKDO/TAKESHIMA ISLANDS 
The competing South Korean and Japanese legal claims to the 
Dokdo/Takeshima Islands share much in common with the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands dispute and the disputes over other uninhabited islands in the South China 
Sea, even while the historical narrative and present-day tangle of claims for each 
set of islands remain distinct.  As such, any third-party dispute resolution process 
that may be agreed offers tremendous opportunity to establish local legal precedent 
in East Asia that may be helpful in resolving other similar disputes, especially 
relating to the sufficiency of ancient discovery, the more common-place historical 
indicia of effective occupation, and the associated maritime resource boundary 
claims. 
Dokdo/Takeshima is located in the Sea of Japan (what South Korea calls the 
East Sea) and consists of two very small rocky islands and approximately thirty-
two smaller outcroppings with a total area of only 0.18 square kilometers, 
approximately 47nm from South Korea’s occupied and inhabited Island of 
Ullungdo and 86nm from Japan’s occupied and inhabited Oki Island.124  The 
islands are currently, and have for decades been, occupied by South Korea.
125
 
While the dominant view in case law and the literature has generally been 
favorable to the South Korean territorial claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, 
submitting the island dispute to the ICJ or another arbitration process, as was long 
ago offered by Japan,
126
 may be more useful to Japan than simply reaching a 
negotiated settlement.  A definitive answer on the merits can only be offered by a 
tribunal with proper jurisdiction.
127
  Such a tribunal can help to establish important 
legal principles.  Such a process would allow the parties to test the water on 
various legal issues that surround this and other similar East Asian island disputes.  
Such test could facilitate gentle removal of a log from the above-noted log-jam. 
As with many uninhabited islands, the historical record to measure the 
required “effective occupation” of Dokdo/Takashima is thin.  In the face of such 
thinness, South Korea, the current occupant of several decades standing would 
 
 124. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 46. 
 125. The Korean Government’s Basic Position on Dokdo, Ministry of Foreign Aff. Republic of 
Korea, http://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/dokdo/government_position.jsp (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
 126. Miller, supra note 73. 
 127. The concern is to submit the matter to a tribunal with proper jurisdiction which, for the ICJ, 
would require consent to jurisdiction either in the case or generally to compulsory jurisdiction.  See 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ 
Statute]. 
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certainly enjoy an advantage.  Japan bases its claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima 
Islands on the theory that the islands were terra nullius on February 22, 1905, 
when Japan first claimed them—under Korean protest—by occupation through a 
cabinet decision and proclamation by the Governor of Japan’s Shimane 
Prefecture.
128
  After such proclamation, on June 5, 1906, the Japanese government 
formally issued a fishing license to one Yozaburo Nakai.
129
  Before 1905, Japan 
could only claim connection through the private acts of Japanese fisherman, with 
official Japanese permission, visiting the islands as early as 1618; this largely 
ended in 1696 when Ulleungdo (not specifically Dokdo, which was merely a 
stopover on the way) was acknowledged by the Japanese Shogunate as under 
Korean sovereignty, resulting in Japanese being denied permission from their 
government to visit the area of either set of islands.
130
  Japan does raise the issue of 
Korean “withdrawal” from the islands from the 15th to the 19th centuries, during 
the period when the region was dominated by the Mongol empire, but South Korea 
highlights a substantial level of visits and contacts during this period and its 
official re-colonization policy from 1881 to justify the maintenance of its claims 
and a lack of abandonment.
131
 
South Korea claims title to Dokdo based on ancient discovery in 512 followed 
up by claimed “effective occupation” in the years since.132  The Korean position is 
further bolstered by the claim that Japan was bound to surrender the islands to 
Korea at the end of World War II, both under Japan’s 1945 Instrument of 
Surrender and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.
133
  The relative proximity of 
the islands to Korean territory and South Korea’s current occupation since 
asserting its claim in 1952 and building a guarded lighthouse in 1954—even 
though protested by Japan every year—would seem to further bolster the Korean 
claim in any close case.
134
  Though the Korean historical title claims are thin, as is 
common for remote uninhabited islands, they appear more substantial than Japan’s 
claims. 
As discussed by the late Professor Pilkyu Kim, South Korea cites a number of 
classical Korean texts, such as the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms, to support 
the following chronology in support of the Korean case: first, the islands were first 
discovered—creating an inchoate title—along with Ulleungdo in 512 by the Silla 
Kingdom, as inferred from the Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms;
135
 second, 
disputes over the islands relating to fisheries were reportedly settled with Japan 
 
 128. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 39-98, 40-44. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 58-60. 
 132. Id. at 45-50. 
 133. Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 2, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45.  Korea was 
not a party to the 1951 peace treaty. 
 134. While any occupation after the critical date that the dispute arises would presumably have no 
effect on the underlying claims, it would seem to at least establish continued occupation and non-
abandonment to the present.  See Peterson, supra note 91; AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 40. 
 135. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 45-50. 
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recognizing Korea’s sovereign rights in 1696;136 third, two prosecutions, one by 
the Royal Court of Korea in 1716 and one by Japan (for smuggling from Japan to a 
foreign island (Dokdo)) in 1837 tend to demonstrate a shared belief in Korean 
sovereignty;
137
 fourth, a number of edicts relating to the islands in the late 19th 
century in the lead up to the Japanese occupation demonstrate continued Korean 
occupation;
138
 fifth, South Korean seizure of the islands in 1954 further indicates 
such claim;
139
 and sixth, continuing South Korean control—over Japanese 
protest—sustains that claim up to the present.140  Kim notes that Japan never 
protested Korean actions until 1905—perhaps the critical date.141  He notes that a 
number of Korean official maps over the centuries, which have shown Dokdo as 
Korean territory, have not been challenged.
142
 
This dispute has been made more difficult by the failure of World War II and 
post-war declarations and treaties to resolve the issue or specifically mention these 
remote islands.  In particular, the San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and 
most allied powers, for which Korea was merely a beneficiary but not a party,
143
 
failed to expressly include the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands among the listed 
territories to be surrendered by Japan.
144
  South Korea emphasizes that it should 
have been included because the San Francisco Peace Treaty incorporated the Cairo 
Declaration of 1943, which called for the forfeiture of all Japanese territory taken 
“by violence or greed.”145  Likewise, the 1945 Potsdam Declaration stated that, 
“[t]he Terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and the Japanese 
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku 
and other minor islands as we determine.”146 
Not being a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, South Korea claims it 
recovered its territory by virtue of the September 2, 1945 Instrument of Surrender, 
by which Japan agreed to both declarations, resulting in the establishment of the 
Republic of Korea on August 15, 1945 and its recognition by the U.N. on 
December 8, 1948.
147
  While the failure of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to 
specifically mention the islands leaves some ambiguity, it would seem that the 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 49, 75-76. 
 142. Id.  The author mentions that even a couple Japanese maps have excluded Dokdo/Takeshima 
Island from Japanese territory. 
 143. Minoru Yanagihashi, The Territorial Questions in East Asia and San Francisco Peace Treaty: 
Historical Perspective, Paper Presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies 
in Honolulu, Hawaii (Apr. 2011). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Press Release, U.S. State Dep’t, Cairo Declaration (Dec. 3, 1943), available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/002_46/002_46_001l.html. 
 146. Potsdam Declaration: Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (July 26, 1945), in 
2 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF.: NIHON GAIKO NENPYO NARABINI SHUYO BUNSHO: 1840-1945 (1966), 
available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html. 
 147. Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 69-71. 
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connection of the Japanese claim to its expansionist policies in 1905, including the 
conquest of Korea, favor the South Korean claim.  South Korea’s subsequent acts 
to seize back the islands from 1952-1954, soon after World War II and its own 
Korean War, would further argue in South Korea’s favor.148 
An important related issue, further discussed below, is the likelihood that 
South Korea would not attempt to claim any resource zones under UNCLOS, 
beyond the territorial sea, thus, making Dokdo/Takeshima irrelevant to delineating 
resource zone boundaries.
149
  Jon Van Dyke notes the near futility of either party 
claiming resource zones for these barren rocks, though the Japanese have been 
reluctant to explicitly so state out of fear this may affect other island claims Japan 
seeks to maintain.
150
  South Korea may be less constrained and may move forward 
to address related resource boundary issues if it acknowledges that 
Dokdo/Takeshima will not have an impact on median boundary lines.  These 
“rocks” clearly cannot independently sustain life and such limitation would be the 
likely outcome of any dispute resolution process before the ICJ or otherwise.  With 
greater proximity to South Korea, the islands would be on the South Korean side 
of any equidistant or median line that may someday be realistically adopted to 
delineate resource zone boundaries between the South Korean Island of Ullongdo 
and the Japanese Island of Oki. 
With much less nationalism at play on the Japanese side for this particular 
island dispute (in comparison to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute discussed below), 
there appears little incentive for Japan to insist on its claim to the island if any 
advantage may be achieved by conceding to a dispute resolution process.  Indeed, 
Japan first proposed submission of the matter to the ICJ in 1954 and again in 
1962.
151
  Rather than surrender its claim, Japan would seemingly be more 
interested in engaging a process that may set a favorable precedent in regard to its 
other island and maritime disputes.  For South Korea, nationalistic sentiments are 
much more deeply felt in relation to these islands and have seemingly stood in the 
way of its willingness to embrace such ICJ resolution.  South Korea has argued 
that this is a matter of sovereignty and should not be subject to ICJ resolution as a 
mere territorial dispute.
152
  Any distinction between territory and sovereignty 
appears weak and has never been a reason for declining ICJ assistance.
153
  Most 
territorial disputes involve sovereignty. 
The natural resource claims at stake in the surrounding sea areas, as discussed 
below, have lent a degree of urgency to this and other related disputes.  This will 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Addressing and Resolving the Dokdo Matter, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INT’L DOKDO SYMPOSIUM, supra note 86, at 137-58. 
 150. Id. at 152-53. 
 151. Ralf Emmers, Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takashima Dispute: The Interplay of 
Nationalism and Natural Resources 12 (S. Rajaratnam Sch. of Int’l Studies Sing. (RSIS), Working 
Paper No. 212, 2010). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Brian Taylor Sumner, Note, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 
DUKE L.J. 1779, 1779 (2004).  See also Island of Palmas, supra note 89, at 8. 
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hopefully encourage further consideration of the merits of a dispute resolution 
process that may bring clarity to the respective rights of the claimants and enable 
private companies from both sides and around the world to move forward on 
extraction of resources increasingly needed in the region.  The post-war political 
climate appeared to be improving until the past couple years, as China’s failure to 
address South Korean concerns in respect to military confrontations with North 
Korea and increasingly tense Sino-Japanese relations had brought South Korea and 
Japan much closer in their existing security alliance, despite continuing tensions 
over Japan’s World War II legacy.154 
The past couple years has seen a shift back toward greater hostility on which 
China has sought to capitalize.  Of concern to Japan’s shared primary security 
partner, the U.S., nationalistic sentiment on both sides threatens to undermine their 
historical security arrangement.  On the South Korean side, such nationalism was 
on display in August 2012 when then President Lee Myung-bak made the first ever 
presidential visit to the Dokdo Islands and again when South Korea formally 
renamed peaks on the islands.
155
  The recent emergence of a more nationalistic 
Japanese leadership under the Liberal Democratic Party has squandered a great 
deal of good will in the past year, as Korean wounds from World War II have been 
exposed.
156
  One would hope this situation is salvageable and level heads will 
prevail. 
V.  SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island claims pose a greater challenge than the 
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute discussed above, with high levels of nationalism at play 
on both sides in Japan and China, and an even more contentious relationship 
between the parties.
157
  Despite efforts to avoid confrontation over this issue a 
number of disputes arose over recent years before things heated up to the tense 
 
 154. Both South Korea and Japan have had shared security arrangements with the United States 
since the end of the Korean War and World War II, respectively, and both host U.S. military bases, 
producing a need for cooperation.  See Sang-hun Choe, South Korea to Sign Military Pact with Japan, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/world/asia/south-korea-to-sign-
historic-military-pact-with-japan.html?_r=0. 
 155. South Korea Renames Disputed Islands, ABC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2012, 12:57 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-28/an-sth-korea-renames-disputed-islands/4338020. 
 156. South Korean President Unimpressed by Japanese PM’s Attempt to Speak Korean, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1457844/seoul-unmoved-
japan-hails-bridge-building-summit?page=all; Alastair Gale, How Bad Will South Korea-Japan 
Relations Get?, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/06/24/how-bad-
will-south-korea-japan-relations-get/. 
 157. See CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA’S 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, ch. 3 (Routledge 2004) (dealing with the nationalist politics behind the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute).  As China has developed and gained greater power over the past decade there 
has appeared a heightened sense of Chinese nationalism over these island disputes.  See Erica Strecker 
Downs & Phillip C. Saunders, Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu 
Islands, in THE RISE OF CHINA 41, 42-43, 73 (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 2000). 
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situation that prevails today.
158
  Recent efforts to even sit down and discuss this 
dispute have been fraught with obstacles from nationalistic sovereignty claims.
159
  
As with Dokdo/Takeshima, the vast store of natural resources of gas and oil 
thought to be in the area, not to mention fisheries, lends great urgency to resolving 
the disputes.  While the former Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba 
appeared to signal, in a commentary in the International Herald Tribune, that Japan 
might accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, to which Japan has acceded generally, 
China has long refused to accept ICJ dispute resolution.
160
  Genba emphasized that 
since Japan now holds the islands and has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ it would be open to China to bring its challenge before the court.
161
  
Professor Jerome Cohen has argued that such a route would offer several 
advantages to both sides, including a cooling off period and, during the long years 
when the matter was before the court, a context in which a settlement would be 
encouraged.
162
 
Short of such an optimal path, there is wiggle room to diminish if not resolve 
this island dispute in several respects: first, as discussed above, a number of ICJ 
and other decisions in recent years have clarified the law, pointing to the likely 
outcome of an international legal decision on the merits;
163
 second, progress 
suggested above for resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute may offer even 
greater clarity on the international legal standards applicable to the 
 
 158. Han-yi Shaw offers an overview of the past developments and the respective claims to the 
islands and discusses crises that arose in 1970, 1978, 1990, and 1996.  Han-yi Shaw, The 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., 
R.O.C., and Japan 13-21 (Univ. of Md., Occasional Papers/Reprint Series, No. 3 (152), 1999). 
 159. Early 2013 proposals for discussions made to China’s new leaders by the new leadership in 
Japan were met with an improved tone but also with caution.  Nothing ever materialized.  Teddy Ng, Xi 
Jinping to Consider Summit with Japan over Diaoyu, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 26, 2013, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1136327/xi-jinping-consider-summit-japan-over-diaoyu-
islands; Jane Perlez, Chinese Leader Takes Conciliatory Tone in Meeting with Japanese Lawmaker, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/asia/chinese-leader-eases-tone-
in-meeting-with-japan-envoy.html. 
 160. Koichiro Genba, Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/opinion/koichiro-genba-japan-china-relations-at-a-
crossroads.html?_r=0. 
 161. Id.  China has so far not met that challenge.  While Beijing has never agreed to ICJ jurisdiction 
generally or specifically over such matters, there has been some speculation that its September 2012 
attempt to assert sea boundary base lines to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands may signal efforts to 
lay the foundation for such litigation.  Teddy Ng, Beijing may seek Legal Solution to Diaoyus Row with 
Japan, Analysts say, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 15, 2012, 12:00 AM).  It should be further noted 
that when Japan acceded to the ICJ in 1958 it attached two reservations: (1) that any compulsory 
jurisdiction was subject to the other disputant having accepted compulsory jurisdiction and (2) that the 
subject under dispute be limited to situations or facts after 1958. Han-yi Shaw, supra note 158, at 128.  
Even if China accepted compulsory jurisdiction the second reservation would be sufficient for Japan to 
avoid jurisdiction in this case if desired. An effort to agree on such would seemingly have to be initiated 
by the PRC. 
 162. Jerome Cohen, How Dangerous Are Sino-Japanese Tensions?, CHINA FILE (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.chinafile.com/how-dangerous-are-sino-japanese-tensions. 
 163. See supra Part IIIA. 
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Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute; third, China’s rapid development and insatiable resource 
needs have brought more urgency to the matter, as has Japan’s almost total reliance 
on imported energy, now increased as a result of diminished use of nuclear power; 
and, fourth, any future Japanese willingness to agree with the position already 
taken by the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and Taiwan that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as “rocks” under UNCLOS Article 121(3), are entitled 
only to a twelve mile territorial sea and not any resource zones—continental shelf 
or EEZ—would surely go a long way to reducing the importance of the dispute. 
In regard to the latter point, as will be discussed in the next section below, any 
Chinese willingness to revise its own baselines vis a vis off-shore islands may 
facilitate such a Japanese move—as these various claims are likely viewed as 
bargaining chips in the overall dispute.  By the same token, any Chinese perception 
that settlements in the East China Sea may positively impact its position in the 
South China Sea may encourage a more responsible effort to abandon some of its 
more extreme claims in favor of compromise. 
On the merits, customary international law regarding such uninhabited island 
claims offers good potential to resolve the sovereignty part of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
dispute.  It seems likely, based on the various ICJ decisions noted above,
164
 that the 
outcome would favor Japan, though this is not certain and only a proper tribunal 
could give a definitive answer.  The historical title record is much thinner than that 
evident for Dokdo/Takeshima.  As with Dokdo/Takeshima, the Japanese 
occupation and formal claim to the islands date to the turn of the 20th century and 
is based on occupation after its determination that the islands were then terra 
nullius.
165
  Japan claims to have acquired title following a series of surveys 
between 1885 and 1895 during which the Japanese deemed there were no signs of 
Chinese control; they formally took control by a cabinet decision issued on January 
14, 1895, by which they incorporated the islands into Japanese territory months 
before Taiwan was conceded under the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
166
  This was 
followed by the granting of concessions to and patrolling of the islands from that 
date forward.
167
 
Japan takes the view that either China had no historical title for lack of 
effective occupation or that any claim they had was abandoned.
168
  A recent 
Japanese media report has turned up a 1950 document from the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry archive that acknowledged the island as Japanese territory, a document 
Japan alleges has spawned closure of relevant parts of the archive for vetting.
169
  
 
 164. See supra Part IIIA. 
 165. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 113. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Situation of the Senkaku Islands, JAPAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/senkaku/page1we_000010.html. 
 169. Julian Ryall, Beijing Cuts Access to Documents ‘that Support Japan’s Claim to Diaoyus’, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1141425/beijing-cuts-
access-documents-support-japans-claim-diaoyus; Curtailed Access to China’s Diplomatic Archives 
Fuels Senkaku Conjecture, JAPAN TIMES, Feb. 1, 2013, 
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Japan notes further that a 1953 article in the official People’s Daily, five years 
after the founding of the PRC, described the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) as 
including the Senkaku Islands, which they feel concedes a lack of Chinese 
claim.
170
 
The PRC position is that these islands are historical Chinese territory dating at 
least from the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) when they were a navigational point in 
the coastal defense system of China and instrumental in its historical tributary 
relationship with the ancient Ryukyu kingdom in present day Okinawa.
171
  Their 
claim is essentially based on discovery plus effective occupation.  But only two 
acts of actual Chinese occupation before 1895 are cited by various sources: the 
islands’ use in the 16th century as a navigational point in the coastal defense 
system and a one-off grant of ownership to a private party by Chinese imperial 
edict in 1893.
172
  Austin argues that inclusion in a coastal defense system to 
contain piracy proves nothing since even high sea locations can be used for this 
navigational purpose; while he accepts that a grant of ownership is an official act, 
he doubts that this seeming one-off arrangement is sufficient to prove effective 
occupation.
173
  A Japanese researcher has also cited a Ming Dynasty document in 
the official annals of the Ming Dynasty (Huangming Shilu) conceding that Chinese 
 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/01/national/history/curtailed-access-to-chinas-diplomatic-
archives-fuels-senkaku-conjecture/#.VFcOGPTF_xo. 
 170. The People’s Daily article cited by the Japanese Foreign Ministry is entitled “the battle of 
people in the Ryukyu Islands against U.S. occupation.”  Press Conference, Assistant Press Secretary, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Oct. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2012/10/1002_01.html; see also Old China Maps have no 
Mention of Diaoyu, Only after 1971 did Charts Lay Claim to Japan’s Senkaku Islets, JAPAN TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/30/national/old-china-maps-have-no-
mention-of-diaoyu/#.UsGhvyfRDcx.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“MOFA”) of Japan frequently 
updates its analysis.  See Situation of the Senkaku Islands, supra note 168. 
 171. China’s official position is laid out in its 2012 White Paper on Diaoyu Dao.  STATE COUNCIL 
INFO. OFFICE OF CHINA, DIAOYU DAO, AN INHERENT TERRITORY OF CHINA (2012), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152.htm.  The White Paper especially 
emphasize missions to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) during the Ming Dynasty to confer titles and 
accept tribute involved passage past Diaoyu Dao, as reflected in the mission records, the role of Diaoyu 
Dao in China’s coastal defense, its inclusion on coastal maps, and the centuries of use by Chinese 
fishermen.  Because of these tribute missions, Chinese nationalist commentators have gone so far as to 
challenge Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa.  China should ‘reconsider’ who owns Okinawa: 
academics, BUS. STANDARD (May 8, 2013), http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/china-
should-reconsider-who-owns-okinawa-academics-113050800900_1.html; Jane Perlez, Calls Grow in 
China to Press Claim for Okinawa, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/asia/sentiment-builds-in-china-to-press-claim-for-
okinawa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  But China so far has merely allowed publication of such claims 
in the official press and has not made an official claim.  China not Disputing Japan Sovereignty over 
Okinawa, REUTERS, June 2, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/02/uk-security-asia-okinawa-
idUKBRE95101R20130602. 
 172. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 164. 
 173. Id. at 165. 
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territorial claims did not reach beyond the Matsu Islands, and thus not as far off 
shore as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
174
 
Chinese writer Han-yi Shaw attacks the Japanese claim that the islands were 
terra nullius, citing Japanese contemporary references to Chinese media reports of 
objections to Japanese surveys beginning in 1885 prior to perfecting the Japanese 
claimed annexation in 1895.
175
  Such media reportage, however, would likely not 
be sufficient to establish title, and the cited instances of reaction to such surveys 
may tend to demonstrate the truthfulness of Japanese claims to perfect their title 
before their military occupation of Taiwan.
176
  There are certainly a variety of 
historical claims on both sides that would best be sorted out and evaluated by the 
ICJ or another agreed arbitral tribunal empowered to resolve the dispute.  There is 
also objection that the 1895 Japanese annexation was not publicized until very 
recently.
177
 
The Chinese agree that the Japanese acquired full sovereignty of the islands in 
1895, but argue this was part of the cession of Taiwan in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, which would give rise to the Japanese obligation to return the islands 
to China after World War II along with the return of Taiwan under the terms of the 
Japanese Instrument of Surrender and the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
178
  Chinese 
ownership would first have to have existed for this obligation to arise. 
Taiwanese scholar Tao Cheng has sought to bolster the Chinese historical title 
claim by an irredentist argument that the then contemporary standard of discovery 
and claim and not the more recent higher standard of “effective occupation” should 
apply, especially in the context of uninhabited territory.
179
  The policy weakness in 
this argument is that it goes against the likely anti-colonialist foundation of the 
“effective occupation” principle,180 that great powers not be able to travel the 
globe, “discover” territory and lay claim with little engagement.  A slightly 
stronger Chinese policy argument, supported by Jon Van Dyke, is that Japan was 
essentially in its expansionary conquest phase when it claimed the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands, that the Japanese cabinet decision, even if earlier than the treaty, was 
essentially part of the same expansionist activity culminating in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, and that such activity should not be recognized as separate and 
 
 174. Chinese Document Contradicts Beijing’s Claim to Senkakus, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Jan. 23, 
2013, http://www.asianewsnet.net/Chinese-document-contradicts-Beijings-claim-to-Sen-41822.html.  
Transcriptions of these records are reportedly available in the National Archives of Japan. 
 175. Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
19, 2012, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-inconvenient-truth-behind-the-
diaoyusenkaku-islands/?smid=tw-share. 
 176. See generally Han-yi Shaw, supra note 158. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.; Cheng, supra note 86, at 259-60. 
 179. See Cheng, supra note 86, at 224-26.  Unryu Suganuma has expressed sympathy for this 
irredentist argument in respect of claims from the Asian millennia of Pax Sinica, but suggests that 
Chinese abandonment after their ancient discovery and claim is an open question.  See UNRYU 
SUGANUMA, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: 
IRREDENTISM AND THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS 101-115 (Joshua A. Fogel ed., 2000). 
 180. See generally Cheng, supra note 86. 
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distinct.
181
  If accepted, this would strengthen the case that the islands should have 
been restored to the ROC (Taiwan) after the war.  The difficulty is that this claim 
may simply be counterfactual, if China lacked a valid historical title and the 
Japanese can prove a sufficient explanation for the 1895 cabinet decision. 
Japan disputes both the claim that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were covered 
by the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the post-war obligation to restore the islands to 
China.  Japanese officials argue that the Japanese cabinet decision annexing the 
islands occurred three months ahead of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and was 
unrelated thereto.
182
  They point out that there was no reference to the islands 
either in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki or the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
provisions respecting restoration of Taiwan.
183
  Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also at 
some distance from Taiwan, arguing against any presumption of inclusion.
184
  
Accordingly, Japan argues that Senkaku/Diaoyu is not included in the reference 
from the Cairo Declaration incorporated in the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
requiring that “all territories Japan has stolen . . . be restored to the Republic of 
China.”185 
By Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan further agreed to 
temporary “exercise of all powers of administration, legislating and jurisdiction” 
by the United States for the Ryukyu Islands south of twenty-nine degrees north, 
under which the U.S. took possession of Okinawa and the remaining Ryukyu 
Islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
186
  The U.S. did not return these 
islands to Japan until 1972 under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.
187
  China did 
not protest the failure to “return” these islands to China along with Taiwan 
(returned right after World War II) until 1970—after a 1969 U.N. study reported 
possibly large oil deposits
188—this may be most damning to the Chinese 
 
 181. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 60-62.  Jerome Cohen and Jon Van Dyke have emphasized that 
Japan fully knew of the Chinese historic claim when they began to take an interest in the islets in 1885, 
noting Japanese acknowledgments during the time and the stealth of its cabinet decision, which was not 
made public until after World War II. Jerome A. Cohen & Jon M. Van Dyke, Lines of Latitude, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.10, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/japan/lines-latitude/p23364. They also 
express concern about Japan’s exaggerated EEZ claim. Id. 
 182. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 168-70. 
 183. Id. 
 184. 355 kilometers.  Distance from Senkaku Islands from Taiwan, GOOGLE MAPS (follow “Get 
Directions” hyperlink; then search “A” for Taiwan and search “B” for “Senkaku Islands”; then follow 
“Get Directions” hyperlink). 
 185. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 170.  After the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the ROC on Taiwan 
entered a peace treaty with Japan that largely reaffirms the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
and expressly nullifies pre-1941 treaties, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  See Treaty of Peace 
Between the Republic of China and Japan, China-Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 139 U.N.T.S. 3.  This ROC-
Japan Peace Treaty makes no mention of Senkaku/Diaoyu.  See id.  It was promptly renounced by the 
PRC. 
 186. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 133, art 3. 
 187. See Agreement between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu 
Islands and the Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 447. 
 188. AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 163. 
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position.
189
  After such oil discovery, and just as the islands were slated for return 
to Japan, China finally filed its protest in 1970.
190
  Both the ROC and PRC 
likewise objected to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971 before the 
reversion was completed.
191
  The first formal point of protest was in 1970; it is 
when the legal dispute finally crystallized, and would thus likely be viewed as the 
critical date.
192
  As such, Japan’s continuous occupation, including the placement 
by Japanese citizens of some lighthouse structures, and frequent patrols since that 
date would not prove ownership.
193
  Likewise, the Japanese government’s recent 
decision to purchase three of the islands from a private title-holder should not have 
any effect on the merits and would not seem to warrant the sharp response it 
received.
194
 
As is frequently true of remote uninhabited islands, the historical title claims 
are somewhat murky, though this seems to favor Japan with both the most recent 
concrete claim and current occupation.  The weak link in Japan’s claim, as 
discussed in the next section, is its failure to proclaim that it will not claim 
resource zones or strait base lines to the islands under UNCLOS.  As an 
archipelagic state under UNCLOS Article 47(1), Japan may typically seek to draw 
strait baselines to the outer point of its outer islands.
195
  On the other hand, if this is 
merely an uninhabited rock, as specified in UNCLOS Article 121(3), then the 
islands should not be entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf.
196
  That the PRC (and 
Taiwan) traditionally proclaimed that Senkaku/Diaoyu was not entitled to such 
resource zones may be some indication of Beijing’s assessment of the strength of 
their claim, given that the PRC has not been shy about making extreme maritime 
claims in the South China Sea.
197
  Such acknowledgement by the PRC also opens 
the door for Japan to climb down on the issue.  Since the PRC is unlikely to agree 
to a dispute resolution process or formally surrender its claim, without a clear 
indication from Japan on the resource boundary issue the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
sovereignty and related resource boundary issues seem likely to remain mired in 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 15 PEKING 
REV. 12, 12 (1972). 
 192. See AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 40. 
 193. Id. at 9, 40-41; see also Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 11 R.I.A.A. 831 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1925). 
 194. Japan to Bring Senkaku Islands Under State Control, HOUSE OF JAPAN (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.houseofjapan.com/local/japan-to-bring-senkaku-islands-under-state-control. 
 195. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 47, ¶ 1. 
 196. Id. art. 121, ¶ 3.  Bernard Oxman argues this may not be relevant when the rock in question is 
already within an EEZ, essentially reducing the rock’s resource zone implications to it role under the 
rules on baselines or archipelagic lines.  Bernard H. Oxman, On Rocks and Maritime Delimitation, in 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 
(Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010). 
 197. Recent attempts in September 2012 by the PRC to draw strait baselines around the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were roundly criticized by the U.S.  U.S. Defense Department criticizes 
China’s claims to Senkaku Islands, JAPAN NEWS, May 8, 2013, http://sinocism.us5.list-
manage1.com/track/click?u=f18121c5942896d3a87491249&id=ced0683c1f&e=654fcbfcc5. 
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dispute.  If that constraint was removed there may be room for forward movement 
regarding the broader maritime sovereignty and resource claims. 
If the resources at stake were reduced by virtue of a Japanese climb-down (to 
claim only territorial waters) on the resource issue, China may want to reconsider 
the value of some form of arbitration.  When asked to explain the mention of 
international law and dispute resolution in the September 2012 speech to the U.N. 
General Assembly by the then Japanese Prime Minister, Japanese officials 
suggested that, unlike Dokdo/Takeshima, Japan is in full possession of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, such that they have no reason to approach the ICJ.
198
  
This statement appears to suggest that if China were to take the case to the ICJ 
Japan may agree to appear, though this is not expressly said. 
As with the above suggestions regarding Japan’s possible handling of 
Dokdo/Takeshima, China may want to consider the value of positive precedent in 
regard to its relatively stronger claim to the Paracel Islands and parts of the 
Spratlys in the South China Sea.
199
  A proper dispute resolution process may also 
allow both governments time to climb down from the nationalistic pressure they 
now experience over this dispute.  A third option would be to designate the island a 
special international resource protection area without resolving the sovereignty 
issue.  Japanese New Komeito Party leader Natsuo Yamaguchi, during a 2013 
official visit to Beijing, offered the more limited proposal of a no-fly zone around 
the islands.
200
 
VI.  ASSOCIATED RESOURCE DISPUTES IN THE SEA OF JAPAN AND THE EAST CHINA 
SEA 
Without question, the tension that pervades these disputes over remote 
uninhabited islands is fueled by the competition for associated resources, though 
nationalistic sentiments about sovereignty may drive civil society pressures.  While 
not all the resource boundary disputes in the relevant sea areas under discussion 
bear a direct relationship to the uninhabited island disputes now under discussion, 
it is undoubted that some seemingly indirect extraordinary claims regarding 
baselines or the continental shelf may serve as bargaining chips that make 
settlement of both the island disputes and the maritime resource boundary disputes 
difficult. 
While the spirit of recent years has been to set aside the island sovereignty 
disputes and attempt to agree on joint resource development zones, this has proven 
difficult on several levels: first, many resource rights in surrounding seas are 
 
 198. Press Conference, supra note 170, ¶ 6. 
 199. In his comprehensive study Greg Austin favored the Chinese position on the Paracel Islands, 
and part of the Spratlys.  AUSTIN, supra note 95, at 98-158.  China has to date essentially refused to 
entertain discussions on the Paracel Islands.  See Greg Torode & Minnie Chan, China Refuses to Yield 
on Paracels, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 2010, http://www.scmp.com/article/733189/china-
refuses-yield-paracels. 
 200. See Teddy Ng, Japanese Politician Calls for Disputed Islands no-fly Zone, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Jan. 22, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1133325/japanese-politician-
calls-disputed-islands-no-fly-zone. 
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thought to directly depend on the territorial sovereignty rights to the uninhabited 
islands; second, at the same time, recent precedent before the UNCLOS 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf raises doubts about resource 
claims for such uninhabited islands;
201
 third, perhaps of greater importance, parties 
may seek to leverage these island claims against the more extreme claims of their 
resource competitor respecting base lines or the continental shelf; and, fourth, a 
background of security concerns and nationalism may make compromise on such 
territorial sovereignty disputes especially difficult.
202
 
A.  Japan-Republic of Korea Maritime Disputes 
In the resource area, the Japan-South Korea relationship again offers the most 
promise for moving forward.  Though saddled with a difficult post-colonial and 
post-war legacy of distrust, robust trade and shared security arrangements in recent 
decades have fashioned a trade and security partnership less saddled with the tense 
competition evident in the Sino-Japanese case.  Except for some recent flare-ups of 
tension over Japan’s war-time record, shared interest and alignments have 
historically fostered a degree of moderation over resource claims.  Both parties 
have not appeared to openly attach EEZ or continental shelf resource claims to 
their Dokdo/Takeshima territorial claims—though this is not absolutely clear, 
given Japan’s tendency to attach such resource zone claims to nearly all small 
islands in its possession.
203
  The recent UNCLOS Commission Recommendation, 
rejecting a Japanese claim to an EEZ for an unoccupied island to the East of Japan, 
would weaken further any effort to claim an EEZ in such context.
204
  South Korea 
has also sought to match the Chinese natural prolongation argument when it comes 
to the continental shelf toward Japan, but one may question how serious South 
Korea can ultimately be about this in the face of the contrary UNCLOS 
jurisprudence noted above. 
With a somewhat less tense relationship over past years, the parties have 
reached a number of agreements.  They were able in 1974 (which came into force 
in 1978, well before UNCLOS) to reach two agreements concerning the 
continental shelf: one is the only boundary agreement ever reached in Northeast 
 
 201. COMM’N ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN REGARD TO THE SUBMISSION MADE 
BY JAPAN ON 12 NOVEMBER 2008, para. 20 (2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/com_sumrec_jpn_fin.pdf [hereinafter 
Commission Recommendation].  Regarding the uninhabited island of Okinotorishima the Commission, 
in the face of Chinese and South Korean objection to Japan’s resource claims, refused to make a 
recommendation.  While this set no precedent on the substantive issue, which presumably would have 
to be submitted to a proper tribunal, it did offer a UN based statement of skepticism regarding such 
claims.  See UN Approves Japan’s Claim on Wider Seas, YOMIURI SHIMBUN/ASIA NEWS NETWORK, 
Apr. 29, 2012, http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20120429-
342721.html. 
 202. South Korea has resource boundary disputes with China and even more difficult and volatile 
maritime boundary issues with North Korea, which are beyond the scope of the present essay. 
 203. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 51-52. 
 204. See Commission Recommendation, supra note 201. 
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Asia, delimiting a median line continental shelf boundary in the northern part of 
the Korea Strait (named the “Tsushima Strait” in Japan);205 the other is the 1974 
(came into effect in 1978) joint development agreement for areas of the East China 
Sea south of Cheju Island bounded by the outer limits of their overlapping 
claims.
206
  China has objected that the resultant joint development zone 
overreaches into Chinese areas and it remains for the two partners to reach 
agreement with China.
207
  The Joint Development Zone agreement provides for 
joint development of resources from the continental shelf in an approximately 
24,000 square nautical mile area where the parties’ continental shelf claims overlap 
in the East China Sea below Cheju Island and has a mandatory period of fifty 
years.
208
 
The resultant Joint Development Zone is mostly on the Japanese side of the 
median because Japan is claiming up to the median line and South Korea is 
claiming natural prolongation beyond the median line.  This generous pre-
UNCLOS Japanese agreement may have inspired China to demand similar 
concessions in its resource dispute with Japan, even though UNCLOS now offers 
no support in this context for China’s natural prolongation argument.  With the 
respective continental shelf boundaries between Japan and South Korea not yet 
resolved this seeming unfairness may require future adjustment in the joint 
development zone if a boundary settlement is ultimately reached around the 
median line approach now favored under UNCLOS.  North of the Korea Strait, 
below any area where North Korean maritime claims are implicated, equidistant 
lines should adequately deal with the resource boundary disputes in the Sea of 
Japan, once the Dokdo/Takeshima issue is resolved. 
In 1998, Japan and South Korea also reached a fisheries agreement, which 
seeks to set aside boundary disputes and accommodate differences over 
Dokdo/Takeshima.
209
  The agreement is a “provisional agreement” under 
UNCLOS Article 74(3) pending final determination of maritime boundaries and 
should have little effect on the territorial or maritime disputes now pending.  Since 
UNCLOS would favor fisheries access agreements to properly maintain fishing 
stock in EEZs,
210
 fishery agreements are more easily achieved and may be 
sustainable even after resolution of boundary issues.  Japan’s excessive use of 
 
 205. Choon-Ho Park, Seabed Boundary Issues in the East China Sea, in SEABED PETROLEUM IN 
NORTHEAST ASIA: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION 19, 19-22 (Selig S. Harrison ed., 2005). 
 206. Id. at 19-20. 
 207. Id. at 21. 
 208. Id. at 20. 
 209. Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Korean Concerning Fisheries, Japan-S. Kor., 
Nov. 28, 1998, I-48295.  See Pilkyu Kim, supra note 86, at 28-30. 
 210. See Marcos A. Orellana, EEZ Fisheries Access Arrangements and the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement, in PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND POLICY 
FRAMEWORK TO COMBAT ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING (Mary Ann Palma et al. 
eds., 2010); U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, UNEP IN 2007 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/AnnualReport/2007/AnnualReport2007_en_web.pdf. 
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strait baselines continues to pose some difficulty in Japan-South Korean 
discussions in this regard.
211
 
B.  China-Japan Maritime Disputes 
The Sino-Japanese maritime resource boundary discussions are far more 
difficult and clearly implicate the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.  Japan has long 
unilaterally designated a median line in the East China Sea between China and 
Japan as the appropriate boundary for both the EEZ and the continental shelf 
resources zones.
212
  The most difficult obstacle to any effort to reach an equitable 
solution has been the Chinese claim to nearly all of the continental shelf between 
China and the Japanese islands on the basis of natural prolongation.
213
  As 
discussed above, recent case law in the ICJ clearly makes such an extreme claim 
untenable for opposite states within 400nm of each other.
214
 
Another major obstacle to mutual accommodation is the tendency of both 
China and Japan to make excessive use of strait baselines.  Before the parties can 
start discussion around an initial median line, there must be some consensus on the 
base lines from which the median line would be drawn.  Since Japan’s baselines to 
the south will be those typical of an archipelago, along the Ryukyu Islands, Japan 
is expected to use strait baselines to the outermost points of the outermost island.
215
  
Such lines should generally not exceed 100nm and “should not depart to any 
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.”216  This 
would seemingly render any attempt to draw a strait baseline from the Japanese 
Ryukyu Islands to the uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands inappropriate. 
The most egregious current Chinese baseline claim should also be dropped: 
China’s strait baselines to the uninhabited high tide elevation called Dongdao 
Island some seventy miles offshore from Shanghai.
217
  It is possible that such an 
extraordinary baseline claim is envisioned as a bargaining chip.  Perhaps China 
may be persuaded to drop this baseline claim if Japan disavowed any claim to any 
 
 211. VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 44-45. 
 212. See Peterson, supra note 92; Kosuke Takahashi, Gas and Oil Rivalry in the East China Sea, 
ASIA TIMES ONLINE (July 27, 2004), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FG27Dh03.html. 
 213. The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated, “On the East China Sea delimitation, China 
has never and will not recognize the so-called ‘median line’ as advocated by Japan.  China upholds the 
principle of natural prolongation to solve the delimitation issue of the East China Sea continental shelf.”  
Chinese Agency, Tentative Translation of FM’s Answers on East China Sea Issue, XINHUA NEWS 
AGENCY, June 24, 2008, quoted in Peterson, supra note 91, at 454, n.137.  China has submitted this 
continental shelf prolongation to the U.N. in a submission entitled “Partial Submission Concerning the 
Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200nm in the East China Sea.”  China Makes U.N. Appeal 
for Maritime Claim, UPI, Dec. 18, 2012, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/12/17/China-
makes-UN-appeal-for-maritime-claim/UPI-60871355720880/. 
 214. See VAN DYKE, supra note 76, at 58; Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, at 35, 
¶ 39 (June 3). 
 215. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 47, ¶ 1. 
 216. Id. art. 47, ¶¶ 2-3. 
 217. See BUREAU OF OCEAN AND INT’L ENVTL. AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
PUB. NO. 117, STRAIGHT BASELINE CLAIM: CHINA (1996). 
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extended baselines from the Ryukyu Islands to Senkaku/Diaoyu, as well as claim 
to any resource zones around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  Both claims would 
appear untenable under UNCLOS as currently interpreted.  If proper baselines 
were agreed upon and the parties could identify an initial equidistant or median 
line, they would still be left with the question of proportionality.
218
  This is 
important, because the larger hydrocarbon reserves are thought to be on the 
Japanese side of the median line.
219
 
As discussed above, a tribunal trying to resolve the Sino-Japanese maritime 
boundary dispute would likely begin with equidistant or median lines and then 
adjust such lines to achieve proportionality between the relative length of the two 
opposing coastlines and the resource zone allocated.
220
  The actual Chinese coast is 
clearly much longer than the Japanese coastal areas along the Ryukyu Island chain, 
which covers most of the area opposite China’s coast.  Using its natural 
prolongation claim, China has sought to claim all the continental shelf to the 
Eastern side of the deep Okinawa Trough that borders the Ryukyu Islands.
221
  
China is thought to be motivated in this regard because the petroleum deposits in 
the Okinawa Trough are reportedly the richest in the East China Sea.
222
  Using the 
appropriate equitable solution and proportionality standards, one suspects the 
boundary line would still fall on the Western side of the Okinawa Trough toward 
China, though a proportionality analysis would bring more resources on to the 
Chinese side of the boundary than a simple median line.
223
 
In spite of these interconnected difficulties, China and Japan in 1997 reached 
a fisheries agreement, covering areas above twenty-seven degrees north, from a 
point about one hundred kilometers north of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
224
  This 
fisheries agreement is rather comprehensive, identifying four fishing zones, 
including undisputed territorial seas, exclusive fishing zones within EEZs, shared 
zones in EEZs straddling median lines, and high seas; there is also provision for 
mutual access to EEZs, fishing quotas, a Joint Fisheries Commission and 
conservation measures.
225
  The exclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu area from 
coverage has left a big gap to generate troubled disputes, such as was evident in 
2010 over Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen for ramming the Japanese patrol 
boat near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and again in the arrest of 13 occupiers in 
2012.
226
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Agreement over the valuable petroleum deposits has proven much more 
difficult due to the value of the resources involved and the troubled boundary 
delimitation disputes noted above.  China had generally sought to have any joint 
development zones located entirely on the Japanese side of Japan’s proposed 
median line, arguing that the continental shelf on the East side of the line is the 
only part in dispute—tracking more or less the pre-UNCLOS resource zone as was 
agreed between Japan and South Korea.
227
  Moderate progress was achieved when 
China and Japan announced on June 18, 2008, in separate press conferences, a 
“principled consensus” to jointly explore and develop natural resources in a 2,700 
square kilometer area in the East China Sea that straddles Japan’s proposed median 
line well to the north of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
228
  The arrangement also appears 
to authorize Japanese corporations to invest in the existing Chinese-operated 
Chunxiao oil and gas field bordering the median line on the Chinese side.
229
  The 
stated objectives of this “principled consensus” have not been implemented, and 
Japan continues to protest that the Chinese drilling near the median line will siphon 
off petroleum from the Japanese side.
230
  Given the peculiarities of the separate 
announcement and continued discussions over full implementation, there is good 
reason to doubt that the “principled consensus” rises to the level of an actual 
agreement.  As indicated in the Japanese press statement, the parties appear to 
view it as a principled consensus to work toward realizing an enforceable 
agreement.
231
  It seemingly envisions joint resource exploration and possible, 
though yet unrealized, shared production.
232
  In fact, continued discussions broke 
down during the 2010 dispute over the Japanese arrest of Chinese fishermen near 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
233
 
Though the process has been too opaque for a clear reading, it appears the 
chief obstacles to further agreement have been the problematic baselines, China’s 
excessive natural prolongation claim regarding the continental shelf and the 
dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu, especially Japan’s failure to formally acknowledge 
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that it would not be entitled to resource zones and extended baselines.  Agreement 
on baselines should be generally achievable through give and take with reference 
to UNCLOS.  On the continental shelf claims, China has historically argued that 
any provisional cooperative agreement for joint development under UNCLOS 
should only apply to the Japanese side of the median line since that is the only 
disputed area.
234
  This is extraordinary in that China is using an excessive 
indefensible claim against the relatively moderate Japanese continental shelf claim 
to effectively say, what is mine is mine and what is yours is ours.  That the rather 
limited “principled consensus” to date involves resource areas on both sides of the 
median line perhaps reveals that the Chinese understand how untenable their more 
extreme natural prolongation claim to the entire continental shelf is. 
On Senkaku/Diaoyu resource claims, China has already acknowledged that 
the islands do not warrant resource zones, though it seemingly has not conceded 
the strait baseline point should it prevail in its claim to the islands.  If there is any 
room for movement it would seem that Japan might be persuaded to abandon 
resource and baseline claims over Senkaku/Diaoyu if China were to drop its 
excessive baseline claim for Dungdao Island or other behind-the-scenes 
“bargaining chips.”  The above noted UNCLOS Commission Recommendation 
rejecting a similar claim for an extended continental shelf would seem to make this 
shift tenable.
235
 
In general, similar strait baseline excesses on both sides could be modified in 
any deal to achieve equity.  In doing so, both sides would not realistically be 
giving up anything and would simply be following established international law, as 
required by UNCLOS.  If the parties could then quietly begin discussions of 
resource boundaries based on the established UNCLOS rules regarding 
equidistance and proportionality, it would seem that an equitable solution would be 
within reach over the entire East China Sea.  Japan’s dropping of any resource 
zone claims for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands might be the proverbial log to be 
gently pulled out to relax the impasse.  The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands should only 
be entitled to a territorial sea of 12nm or less. 
C.  Security Concerns 
The seas as a resource also include the maritime role in security and the 
question of military passage.
236
  In the coastal resource zones, the coastal state 
usually has complete control over living and nonliving resources and can limit 
marine scientific research, but other states otherwise retain normal rights 
associated with the high seas and air passage over international waters.
237
  In this 
regard, UNCLOS protects freedom of navigation for military and commercial 
passage by ships of other countries through such zones, an issue about which 
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China has some objections.
238
  Associated military surveillance activities are 
usually thought to be protected activity, as it is allowed on the high seas more 
generally. 
China has especially objected to U.S. military activities in the area,
239
 
including hydrographic surveys by U.S. military ships in China’s EEZ, surveys 
that the U.S. argues are in furtherance of submarine navigation.
240
  China 
characterizes such passage and seabed surveys as marine scientific research, which 
would require China’s permission under UNCLOS.241  While participating in the 
Rim of the Pacific (“RIMPAC”) maritime exercise, China was reported to be 
spying on the so-called “Rim Pac” exercises off Hawaii in the U.S. EEZ, which 
raises the question whether China will continue to object to surveillance activity in 
its EEZ.
242
  China’s recent proclamation of an ADIZ across much of the area 
between China and Japan beyond China’s EEZ is thought to have dual purpose of 
seizing control over the air above disputed islands and also constraining 
surveillance flights through the area.
243
  The U.S. argues the naval sea and air 
hydrographic and military surveys are permitted under in the UNCLOS convention 
and that the surveillance flights above international waters are unrestricted.
244
  On 
that basis, the U.S. likewise did not object to the Chinese ship surveillance in the 
U.S. EEZ during RIMPAC. 
This question of military passage and surveillance has caused confrontation 
between the U.S. and China several times in recent years.
245
  Such incidents have 
included a Chinese air crash and the forced landing of a U.S. plane on Hainan 
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Island in 2001,
246
 Chinese damage to sonar equipment on the U.S.S. Impeccable 
engaged in monitoring of Chinese submarines in the EEZ off Hainan Island in 
2009,
247
 and the controversy over joint US-South Korean exercises in the Yellow 
Sea in 2010, where the Chinese objected to the presence of U.S. warships.
248
  That 
the U.S. has defense agreements with nearly all countries surrounding 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Island and that it has reiterated the inclusion of these islands as 
part of its commitment to defend Japanese administered territory emphasizes the 
connection of disputes over the islands and resources to the U.S. perception of 
overall security volatility in the area.
249
 
The combination of the U.S. “pivot” toward Asia, China’s increased 
projection of power in the region, and the expanded military buildup by Japan and 
the Philippines predicts continued volatility over these security issues.
250
  U.S. 
involvement may serve to check Chinese military aggression but it also adds 
increased risk of miscalculation.
251
  That China engages in increased military 
activity offshore from Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and is sometimes 
suspected of using poorly identified fishing boats in security roles, adds to the 
volatility of its various island disputes.
252
 
Some analysts believe China’s heightened belligerence, especially with Japan, 
may reflect the leadership’s aim to create a more confrontational environment in 
which to whip China’s largely untested PLA into shape.253  Japanese Admiral 
Fumio Ota sees Chinese military intrusion into Japanese EEZs, in combination 
with the lack of transparency concerning China’s military build-up and activities, 
as having the highest risk of occurrence among Sino-Japanese conflict risks.
254
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Query whether this lends support to Japanese suspicions about greater Chinese 
ambitions beyond the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), 
which China treated as a tributary kingdom for five hundred years before the 
Japanese annexation in 1879?
255
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The above overview has exposed the two sets of island disputes as a cause 
that has soured relations between the three protagonists (along with the ROC on 
Taiwan and the United States) for the last half-century.  This article has sought to 
show that a series of contingent relationships between various island and resource 
claims have led the parties to cling to various claims as bargaining chips in a 
dispute process defined by bluster and excess.  As long as the parties were content 
to defer resolution of these disputes for another time as they set about the process 
of trade and development this standoff or log-jam may have been optimal.  But 
with increasing resource scarcity brought on by rapid economic development in the 
region and increasing security ambitions by a rapidly developing China, this 
standoff has become untenable and a serious security risk.  If one adds to this mix 
the nationalistic passions that these contests over sovereignty have caused the 
danger of miscalculation leading to military confrontation becomes even more 
evident. 
The good news is that these problems are solvable far short of military 
confrontation.  Since the parties engaged these issues in the early 1970s, 
considerable international legal principles have developed either through treaty law 
or international case precedent in the ICJ.  Such legal principles offer the parties 
substantial guidance on nearly all of the contentious issues, including: appropriate 
baseline delineation,
256
 the use of the equidistant principles,
257
 proportionality,
258
 
equitable boundaries for maritime resources,
259
 the standards for territorial disputes 
and historical title in the context of disputes over uninhabited islands,
260
 and the 
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allocation of resource zones around such uninhabitable islands.
261
  Given that the 
past practice of ignoring the island disputes and trying to reach resource 
agreements has not worked, this article offers a contrarian view that the island 
disputes may be the proverbial logs jamming up the process and recommends that 
attention to these issues be prioritized. 
Both the island disputes can be taken off the table, either by complete 
resolution, as seems tenable in the case of Dokdo/Takeshima, or by abandoning 
resource zone claims, as is clearly called for in respect of Senkaku/Diaoyu.  An 
even better, though unlikely, solution to the latter would be for China to take up 
Japan’s somewhat ambiguous invitation to present the matter to the ICJ.  
Presumably, none of the parties would want to be seen by their nationals to simply 
surrender the islands they claim.  In the case of Dokdo/Takeshima, the somewhat 
lesser nationalistic sentiments on this particular claim on the Japanese side has 
allowed Japan to propose referral to the ICJ.  South Korea should take advantage 
of this opening.  The South Korean argument that this is a matter of sovereignty 
that cannot be submitted to the ICJ is indefensible.  The many territorial disputes 
that make up the bulk of ICJ cases in this area cited herein are all sovereignty 
disputes.  As has been evident in past compromises over fisheries and joint 
development zones, compromise is something both Japan and South Korea are 
capable of. 
With the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute out of the way and a reasonable 
willingness to adhere to the UNCLOS requirements to apply established 
international legal standards towards agreeing on equitable solutions—including 
baselines and proportional resource allocation—chances are good that all such 
issues between South Korea and Japan could be solved.  It would then be up to the 
parties, as a matter of prudence, to favor either cooperative arrangements or 
resource boundary delineation and separate development.  It could then be hoped 
that the approach taken and the standards set may have some effect on the parties’ 
ability to reach compromise with China on other island and resource issues.  
Cooperative resource development should be about economic development and 
efficiency and not simply a way of avoiding the equitable solutions specified by 
UNCLOS.  Having needed resources available for commercial harvesting in the 
region may be more important than who owns the underlying right. 
It has to be acknowledged that it may be more difficult to reach final 
resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyu sovereignty dispute.  It appears civil society on 
both sides have displayed an enhanced level of nationalism over this issue, making 
compromise on sovereignty difficult.  At the same time, China has long been 
reluctant to agree to arbitration for matters of this sort.  What may be more realistic 
is to find a way to trim back the resource issues that are implicated.  This is the log 
that can be gently removed from the log-jam if the parties can honestly understand 
the bargaining chips they have deployed.  The most obvious bargain would be 
Japanese acknowledgment that the islands are entitled under UNCLOS neither to 
resource zones nor strait baseline inclusion in the Ryukyu Islands.  At the same 
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time the Chinese side must appreciate that Dongdao Island is likewise not entitled 
to strait baseline inclusion.  Beyond these two cases, there are other baseline issues 
offering room for equitable tradeoffs.  While solving the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute 
fully as suggested for Dokdo/Takeshima may be an optimal first choice, trimming 
back the island dispute to acknowledge resource irrelevance is a good second-best 
alternative that would be consistent with the parties’ international legal obligations.  
Perhaps then designating the islands a joint special resource conservation zone 
may diminish the nationalistic sensitivities.
262
 
International legal obligations, when it comes to delineating continental shelf 
rights, likewise clearly require agreement on an equitable solution based on a mix 
of equidistant lines and proportionality.  The relevant baselines from which these 
principles would be applied have also been made relatively clear by UNCLOS 
jurisprudence.  While both sides would likely have to surrender some of the 
resources they would hope for, the resolution of these disputes would surely pay 
great dividends in allowing nearby undersea resources to be commercially 
developed.  The parties would need to decide whether to go the joint development 
or boundary delineation route.  One would hope the recent improved relations 
between Taiwan and the mainland of China would allow appropriate sharing of 
whatever benefit was achieved from the Sino-Japanese progress on these sensitive 
issues.  If trimmed back for resource purposes, perhaps the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands could simply be designated as a joint bird sanctuary with jointly managed 
fishing rights in conjunction with agreements concerning adjoining areas, as seems 
appropriate for friendly neighboring countries. 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that moving forward in Northeast Asia 
may provide a more coherent standard for moving forward on the island disputes 
in the South China Sea.  Some leading scholarly opinion favors China on parts of 
the Paracel Islands and multiple claimants on the Spratlys.  If underlying 
international legal standards are teased out first between South Korea and Japan, 
and then between China and Japan, such resolution may provide precedent for a 
more fruitful effort to resolve similar disputes in the South China Sea.  Pulling 
various logs from the log-jam may make further progress in its removal possible.  
At a minimum, any party that refuses to follow the clearly emerging international 
legal standards, who clings to excessive bargaining chips, would be exposed and 
have to bear the diplomatic cost. 
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